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7Preface
Philosophical pracƟ ce is gradually becoming an established philosophical profession with an 
increasing amount of clients such as organizaƟ ons, government or individuals. Whilst retaining the 
philosophical curiosity faced with the perennial quesƟ ons of life, meaning and values, philosophical 
pracƟ ce seeks to make the philosophy of any school, conceptual background or methodological 
focus as pracƟ cal as any discipline can become: it seeks to use philosophy to foster the quality and 
transparency of the meaning of life, both organisaƟ onal (or corporate) and individual. The community 
of philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners has grown to an impressive group of philosophers ranging from the 
so-called philosophical ‘generalists’ to specialists from varied fi elds as philosophy of language on the 
one hand and tradiƟ onal metaphysics, on the other engaged in consultaƟ ons, advice of organizaƟ ons 
or facilitaƟ ng SocraƟ c group dialogue. The common denominator of all these philosophers’ work is 
their quest to allow the wisdom, experience and conceptual rigour that characterise philosophy to 
bear upon the soluƟ on of everyday individual or organisaƟ onal problems, dilemmas and issues.
 Apart from becoming a profession, philosophical pracƟ ce is generaƟ ng another impact, which 
has not been suffi  ciently addressed so far. It is impacƟ ng the mainstream academic philosophy in 
ways that need to be criƟ cally explored so that the interacƟ on of philosophical pracƟ ce and the 
philosophy limited to teaching and research is made fruiƞ ul. Namely, philosophical pracƟ ce is 
opening enƟ rely new areas and themes of philosophical insight that require novel methods and new 
resources to be invested in the tradiƟ onal philosophical exploraƟ on of the actual pre-requisites, 
contexts and consequences of the applicaƟ on of philosophy to everyday life. This is an exciƟ ng area 
of research which promises to emancipate some aspects of tradiƟ onal academic philosophy from 
its main problem these days: its removed posiƟ on from the public and the everyday concerns of 
ordinary people. At the same Ɵ me, philosophical pracƟ ce is establishing itself as a genuine discipline 
of academic philosophy, as the pracƟ cal applicaƟ on of philosophy leads, as in all areas of philosophical 
life, to the opening of new philosophical quesƟ ons. Philosophical pracƟ ce is thus both a profession 
and a philosophical issue in itself. This is so much the case that the impact of the lessons learned in 
philosophical pracƟ ce deserves the name of a new discipline of research and teaching philosophy 
itself.
The aim of the 13th InternaƟ onal Conference of Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners is to bring together, 
in a highly inclusive way, philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners from around the world and generate a series of 
sessions which will show the public what philosophical pracƟ ce is and how it is growing into both 
a profession and a new philosophical discipline. DemonstraƟ ons prevail. However, the conference 
also provides accredited master classes for philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners, opportuniƟ es for exchange 
of experience among pracƟ Ɵ oners, lessons for students or lay public, and free consultaƟ ons by 
pracƟ Ɵ oners from all over the world.
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Conference Programme 
15 August 2014
9.00-9.30: RegistraƟ on
9.30-10.00: Welcome addresses (Professor Petar Bojanić, Director of the InsƟ tute for 
Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade); Professor Nada Popović-Perišić, Dean 
of the Faculty for Media and CommunicaƟ on) (Lecture hall 8, 4th fl oor).
10.00-11.30: Plenary: Introductory lecture, Lou Marinoff  (USA) (Lecture hall 8, 4th fl oor). 
Chaired by Vaughna Feary (USA).
12.00-13.30: PresentaƟ ons:
Session 1 (1.5 hour): Chair: Detlef Staude (Switzerland). 1. Peter Harteloh (Netherlands): 
Philosophical pracƟ ce as a new paradigm in philosophy; 2. Audrey Gers (France):, The 
preacher — Teaching and learning (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor).
Sesssion 2 (1.5 hour): Chair: Jose Barrientos Rastrojo (Spain). 1. Minke Tromp (Netherlands): 
Polimorphous raƟ onality and philosophical pracƟ ce: Philosophy as working on and with 
polymorphous raƟ onaliƟ es; 2.  Antonio Sandu and  Ana Caras (Romania):  Using appreciaƟ ve 
inquiry in the construcƟ on of codes of ethics (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (1.5 hour): Chair: Oscar Brenifi er (France). 1. Luisa de Paula (Italy): Out of the 
shadow: Philosophical pracƟ ce as a laboratory of gender idenƟ ty; 2. Dena Hurst (USA): 
Woman as healer (Lecture room 1, 1st fl oor).
Session 4 (1.5 hour): Chair: Will Heutz (Netherlands). 1. Vaughn J. Fayle (Italy): The new 
role of the seminary philosopher as a philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner; 2. Ibanga Ikpe (Botswana): 
Philosophical therapy and the insanity of war (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor). 
15:00-17.00: Plenary: Debate on Diagnosis in Philosophical PracƟ ce (moderator Aleksandar 
FaƟ ć) (Lecture hall 8, 4th fl oor). 
17.30-19.00: PresentaƟ ons:
Session 1 (1.5 hour): Chair: Dimitrios Dentsoras (Canada). Ora Gruengard (Israel): Philosophical 
and cultural pluralism; 2. Jose Barrientos Rastrojo (Spain): PRT (PracƟ cing-Reseearching-
Training) ― A standard for Spain and Iberoamerica (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor).
Session 2 (1.5 hour):  Chair:  Jörn Kroll (USA): 1. Lydia Amir (Israel): RaƟ onality and truth in 
philosophy and its pracƟ ce; 2. Roxana Kreimer (ArgenƟ na): Philosophy and philosophical 
pracƟ ce from a stand up point of view (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (1.5 hour):  Chair: Gerardo Primero (ArgenƟ na). 1. Tetsuya Kono, Yohsuke Tsuchiya 
and Mai Miyata (Japan): EvaluaƟ ng philosophical dialogue; 2. Helen Douglas (South Africa): 
Giving birth to Derrida’s mother: Philosophical pracƟ ce at the end of philosophy (Lecture 
room 1,1st fl oor).
Session 4 (1.5 hour): Chair: Michael Noah Weiss (Norway). 1. Bernt Österman (Finland): 
Philosophising and neo-SocraƟ c dialogue; 2. FinnThorbjørn Hansen (Denmark): In the 
beginning was the deed ― How philosophical pracƟ ce can become an important element 
both in the phenomenological-oriented acƟ on research and creaƟ ve and innovaƟ ve university 
pedagogy (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor).
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9.00-11.00: Masterclasses:
1.  Anders Lindseth (Norway): The beginnings of philosophical pracƟ ce. Chaired by Viktoria 
Chernyenko (Russia) (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
2.  Detlef Staude (Switzerland): Everyone’s peculiar way of philosophical pracƟ ce. Chaired by 
Helen Douglas (South Africa) (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor).
3. José Eustáquio Moreira de Carvalho (Brasil): Philosophical pracƟ ce and overindebtedness. 
Chaired by Roxana Kreimer (ArgenƟ na). (Lecture room 1, 1st fl oor).
11.30-13.30: Plenary: Debate on philosophical pracƟ ce in the East and in the West 
(moderator Peter Harteloh) (Lecture hall 8, fourth fl oor).
15.00-16.30: PresentaƟ ons:
Session 1 (1.5 hour): Chair: Ora Gruengard (Israel).  1. Vaughna Feary (USA): Spirituality 
and philosophical pracƟ ce: Group counseling with clients in crisis; 2. Young E. Rhee: Does 
philosophical pracƟ ce need diagnosis? (Lecture hall 8, fourth fl oor).
Session 2 (1.5 hour): Chair: Maria Neves (Portugal). 1. Dimitrios Dentsoras  (Canada): Two 
concepƟ ons of happiness ― Flourishing and feeling happy;  Andrzej Kapusta (Poland): 
Philosophical pracƟ ce — Between philosophy of health and personalized educaƟ on (Lecture 
room 8a, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (1.5 hour): Chair: Luisa de Paula (Italy). 1. Sergey Borisov (Russia): The project 
of Faculty of PracƟ cal Philosophy for a pedagogical university; 2. Donata Romizi (Austria): 
Philosophical pracƟ ce in the secondary school: changing the way of teaching philosophy 
(Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 4 (1.5 hour): Chair:  Ivana Zagorac (CroaƟ a). 1. Jörn Kroll (USA): Hegel’s logic of 
transformaƟ on: Personal, interpersonal and socio-poliƟ cal dynamics; 2. Eckart Ruschmann 
(Austria): Metaphysical concepts of lay philosophers (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor).
17.00-18.30: PresentaƟ ons:
Session 1 (1.5 hour): Chair: Dena Hurst (USA). 1. José Barrientos Rastrojo (Spain): Philosophical 
pracƟ ce based on experience as opposed to an analyƟ c philosophical pracƟ ce; 2. Jon Borowicz 
(USA): Treading the boundary of public and private (Lecture hall 8, 4th fl oor).
Session 2 (1.5 hour): Chair: FinnThorbjørn Hansen (Denmark). 1.Thomas Steinforth (Germany): 
Philosophical pracƟ ce and the truth of desire; 2. Michael Picard (Canada): But is it philosophy? 
Cafe philosophy and the social coordinaƟ on of inquiry (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (1.5 hour): Chair: Andrzej Kapusta (Poland). 1. Gerardo Primero (ArgenƟ na): The 
dialogue between philosophy and psychology; Ioannis S. Christodoulou (Cyprus): Philosophy: 
The elixir of health (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor).
Session 4 (1.5 hour): Chair: Minke Tromp (Netherlands). 1. Leonid Dzhorzhovich Petryakov 
(Russia): Philosophical discourse against the markeƟ ng of illusions; 2. Oriana Brücker 
(Switzerland): PracƟ cing philosophy in the working place: Between uƟ litarianism and shared 
metaphysics (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor).
18.30: Assembly of all parƟ cipants to go the InsƟ tuƟ on of Culture ‘Parobrod’ for philosophical 
cabaret performance.
19.00-20.15: Philosophical cabaret performance by Barbara Jones (USA), Parobrod Cultural 
Centre.
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9.00-11.00: Plenary: Debate on RaƟ onality and Experience in Philosophical PracƟ ce 
(moderated by Ora Gruengard) (Lecture hall 8, fourth fl oor).
11.30-13.30: Masterclasses:
1. Lou Marinoff  and Vaughna Feary (USA):  Philosophical Counseling. Chaired by Barbara 
Jones (USA) (Lecture hall 8, 4th fl oor).
2. Oscar Brenifi er (France): Philosophy as a pracƟ ce. Chaired by Audrey Gers (France) (Lecture 
room 8a, 4th fl oor).
3. Will Heutz (Netherlands): 30 years of experience as a philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner. Chaired 
by Detlef Staude (Switzerland) (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor). 
15.00-16.30: Plenary: Ran Lahav (USA) lecture: Philosophical pracƟ ce: Quo Vadis?  Chaired 
by Lydia Amir (Israel) (Lecture hall 8, fourth fl oor).
17.00-19.00: Workshops
Session 1 (2 hours):  Peter Harteloh (Netherlands): A framework for diagnosis in philosophical 
counseling. Chaired by José Eustáquio Moreira de Carvalho (Brasil) (Lecture room 8a, 4th 
fl oor).
Session 2 (2 hours): Willi Fillinger (Switzerland): Philosophical pracƟ ce and my life experience. 
Chaired by Eckart Ruschmann (Austria) (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (2 hours): Viktoria Chernyenko (Russia): Philosophical pracƟ ce. A way to know 
yourself through your arguments. Chaired by Ioannis Christodoulou (Cyprus) (Lecture room 
1, 1st fl oor).
Session 4 (2 hours): Minke Tromp (Netherlands): Selling skills for philoso phers. Chaired by 
Young E. Rhee (Korea) (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor).
18 August 2014
9.00-11.00: Workshops:
Session 1 (2 hours):  V.M. Roth (Switzerland): Tony and Phil: Yalom’s literary vision of a co-
operaƟ on in the Schopenhauer-cure. Chaired by Willi Fillinger (Switzerland) (Lecture hall 9, 
5th fl oor).
Session 2 (2 hours): Zoran Kojčić (CroaƟ a): Mobile philosophy. Chaired by Sergey Borisov 
(Russia) (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (2 hours): Bruno Ćurko (CroaƟ a): The ‘Game of defi ning’. Chaired by Oriana Brücker 
(Switzerland) (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor).
Session 4 (2 hours): Miloš Jeremić (Serbia): HermeneuƟ cs with children. Chaired by Beatrice 
Popescu (Romania) (Lecture room 1, 1st fl oor).
Session 5 (2 hours): Michael Noah Weiss (Norway): Daimonion ― A workshop on guided 
imagery and Socrates’ inner voice. Chaired by Thomas Steinforth (Germany). (Lecture room 
7, 4th fl oor)
11.30-13.00: PresentaƟ ons and workshop:
Session 1 (1.5 hour):  Chair: Antonio  Sandu (Romania). 1. Takako Ijiri (Japan): Philosophical 
pracƟ ce for high school students aŌ er the Great East Japan Earthquake on 3 November 2011; 
2. Igor Nevvazhay (Russia): Legal philosophy as a prospect of philosophical pracƟ ce (Lecture 
hall 9, 5th fl oor).
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Session 2 (1.5 hour): Chair: Vaughn J. Fayle (Italy). 1. Rastko Jovanov  (Serbia): Hegel on 
the therapeuƟ c dimensions of state and philosophy;  2. Maria João Neves (Portugal): The 
phenomenology of dreams in philosophical pracƟ ce (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor).
Session 3 (1.5 hour): Chair: Ibanga Ikpe (Botswana). 1. MaƟ as Österberg and Marianne 
Airisniemi (Finland): The facilitator in Neo-socraƟ c dialogue ― some refl ecƟ ons on problems 
and pracƟ cal techniques; 2. Aleksandra Bulatović: Philosophical counseling as a tool to 
enhance social well-being (Lecture room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 4 (2 hours): Workshop ― Audrey Gers (France): The preacher ― Teaching and 
learning. Chaired by Dominique Hertzer (Germany) (Lecture room 1, 1st fl oor).
Session 5 (1.5 hour): Chair: Young E. Rhee (Korea). 1. Ivana Zagorac (CroaƟ a): The fl ower 
of evil: On the phenomenon of boredom; 2. Stefania AndreƩ a (Italy): The senƟ ment of 
loneliness in philosophical counseling: ExistenƟ al solitude in E.M. Cioran and methodology 
of the negaƟ ve in philosophical pracƟ ce (Lecture room 3, 1st fl oor).
14.30-16.00: Plenary: ElecƟ on of the host of the 14th ICPP (Lecture hall 9, fi Ō h fl oor).
16.30-18.00: PresentaƟ ons:
Session 1 (1.5 hour): 1. Gordana Medić-Simić (Serbia): On encouraging the ‘inner guidance’; 
2. Katarina MarƟ nović and Darko Kerekeš (Serbia): ApplicaƟ on of ChrisƟ an philosophy to 
working with parents of children with developmental disabiliƟ es (Lecture hall 9, fi Ō h fl oor).
Session 2 (1.5 hour): Chair: Viktoria Chernyenko (Russia). 1.. Dominique Hertzer (Germany): 
The Chinese art of ‘feeding one’s life’ (yangsheng): The potenƟ al of Daoism for philosophical 
pracƟ ce; 2. An-Bang Yu (Taiwan): The encounter of nursing and the clinical humaniƟ es: 
Nursing educaƟ on and the spirit of Healing (Lecture room 8a, 4th fl oor). 
Session 3 (1.5 hour): Chair: Bernt Österman (Finland). 1. Pia Houni (Finland): How SocraƟ c 
Dialogue encourages people to talk; 2. Aleksandar FaƟ ć (Serbia): Recognising confl ict in 
philosophical counseling: What can Hegel contribute to philosophical pracƟ ce. (Lecture 
room 7, 4th fl oor).
Session 4 (1.5 hour): Chair: V.M. Roth (Switzerland): 1. Tian-QunPan, Chun-Gui Yang (China): 
The approach of analyƟ cal philosophy to philosophical pracƟ ce; 2. Jones Irwin (Ireland): 
Ethical and comparaƟ ve religious educaƟ on as a form of philosophical pracƟ ce (Lecture 
room 3, 1st fl oor).
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PAPER PRESENTATION
THE FACILITATOR IN NEOͳSOCRATIC DIALOGUE ͵ SOME REFLECTIONS 
ON PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL TECHNIQUES
by
MaƟ as Österberg 
Marianne Airisniemi
Finnish Philosophical AssociaƟ on Interbaas
maƟ as.osterberg@gmail.com
The purpose of this presentaƟ on is to discuss, explore and determine challenges and problems 
one is likely to face as a facilitator. The focus will be on describing and presenƟ ng possible soluƟ ons 
regarding specifi c issues. We seek to off er valuable techniques and tools for professionals in the fi eld 
of philosophical pracƟ ce.
In the past years Finnish Philosophical AssociaƟ on Interbaas has conducted Neo-SocraƟ c 
dialogues with parƟ cipants of diff erent age groups and with varying backgrounds. These experiences 
have raised our interest for quesƟ ons concerning the details of facilitaƟ ng pracƟ ces. What are the 
pedagogical goals – if there are any – of the dialogue and what are the measures one can take to 
help the group to reach them? What are the appropriate means for that the facilitator to intervene 
into discussion? Should the role of the facilitator be seen more as an observer and assistant or 
as someone who leads, corrects and helps the parƟ cipants to reach a higher and deeper level of 
thinking, both individually and together as a group itself? Is the facilitator’srole dependent on skills 
of the group, and if so, in which way? What methods and pracƟ ces can the facilitator use in order to 
remain open and sensiƟ ve to the thinking being done by the group on its own, and at the same Ɵ me 
demand and retain a certain philosophical rigour in the thinking processes? How can the facilitator 
help parƟ cipants to understand in which way the trains of thought develop during the course of the 
dialogue – regardless of how strongly he had guided the discussion? And is this an important task?
Biography
MaƟ as Österberg majored in philosophy at the University of Helsinki, where he received his 
M.A.in 2013. Österberg has been acƟ ve in the Finnish Philosophical AssociaƟ on Interbaas since 
2005. With the associaƟ on he has worked with diff erent forms of philosophical pracƟ ce. He has 
parƟ cipated, hosted and facilitated SocraƟ c dialogues and philocafés. He has also been working with 
SocraƟ c dialogue with highschool students. In 2012 – 2014 he parƟ cipated in Helge Svare’s course 
on SocraƟ c dialogue, where the aim was to develop and enrich facilitaƟ ng skills.MaƟ as Österberg is 
currently working on a project on remedial teaching in mathemaƟ cs at a vocaƟ onal training center 
in Helsinki.
Marianne Airisniemi majored in philosophy at the University of Helsinki, where she received 
her B.A. Airisniemi is acƟ ve in the Finnish Philosophical AssociaƟ on Interbaas since its establishment 
in 2001. Through the associaƟ on she has worked with philosophical pracƟ ce in various ways, 
hosƟ ng, facilitaƟ ng and parƟ cipaƟ ng in SocraƟ c dialogues and philocafés. She has conducted 
visits to high schools in the Helsinki region, where the focus has been on reading, discussing and 
analysing excerpts from philosophical texts. In 2013 she has also been working on introducing the 
SocraƟ c dialogue to high school. From 2007 to 2011 Airisniemi worked as a philosophy teacher in 
two diff erent high schools, Brändö Gymnasium and Gymnasiet Lärkan. Airisniemi also worked in 
projects concerning philosophy for children, where she mostly used Bo Malmhester’s methods.In 
2010 she coorganized the conference Philosophy at School with the University of Helsinki, where 
among others, Bo Malmhester and Oscar Brenifi er held workshops. Marianne Airisniemi is currently 
a fi tness professional in Helsinki.
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RATIONALITY AND TRUTH IN PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PRACTICE 
by
Lydia Amir
School of Media Studies, College of Management Academic Studies, Rishon LeZion
lydamir@colman.ac.il
Philosophy and its pracƟ ce are diff erenƟ ated from other disciplines and techniques through 
their emphasis on raƟ onal and truth-oriented thought. This form of thinking is oŌ en criƟ cal of other 
kinds of thought as well as of non-cogniƟ ve processes such as emoƟ ons and desires. Societal, religious 
and moral values are oŌ en embedded in the former. Re-evaluaƟ ng these values may cause anxiety 
and pain, which adds to the discomfort occasioned by sustained thought. The problems associated 
with the nature of philosophic thought are especially signifi cant when philosophy deliberaƟ vely 
abandons its esoteric habits and aƩ empts to cater to the needs of an exoteric audience. Such is 
the case in the current pracƟ ce of philosophy.  Based on the history of the pracƟ ce of philosophy as 
well as on contemporary research, I propose in the lecture a device that helps in bridging the gap 
between the philosophical ideals of raƟ onality and truth and the more pedestrian situaƟ on and 
capaciƟ es that characterize most persons. This device can be useful to the philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner 
who aƩ empts to live a philosophic life and to the philosophical counselor who aƩ empts to impart 
philosophic ideas. It will appeal to the client as well. 
Biography
Dr. Lydia Amir is senior lecturer in Philosophy at the College of Management Academic Studies 
in Israel, where she is head of HumanisƟ c Studies in the School of Media Studies. Apart from teaching 
philosophy in a pracƟ cal manner, she works since 1992 as philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner with individuals, 
groups and organizaƟ ons. She airs a weekly radio program on Philosophy in Everyday Life (“DioƟ ma”), 
which along with bibliographies consƟ tutes an internet encyclopedia of philosophic concepts useful 
for daily life. CerƟ fi ed (honorary) by the American Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners AssociaƟ on, she has 
parƟ cipated in all of the internaƟ onal conferences of Philosophical PracƟ ce, and is regularly invited 
to lecture and conduct workshops on the pracƟ ce of philosophy outside of Israel. She has published 
arƟ cles and essays on Modern philosophy, issues in ethics, the relaƟ on between philosophic theory 
and pracƟ ce, and philosophical counseling. Her 2014 book on Humor and the Good Life in Modern 
Philosophy: ShaŌ esbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press) 
features also her own vision of the good life she calls homo risibilis (ridiculous man). She is board 
editor of Philosophical PracƟ ce: Journal of the American Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners AssociaƟ on, 
and other philosophy journals, as well as associate editor of various humor research journals. She 
volunteers to promote organizaƟ onal transparency and ethics in SHVIL (Transparency InternaƟ onal 
Israel), She volunteers to promote organizaƟ onal transparency and ethics in SHVIL (Transparency 
InternaƟ onal Israel), and is the president of “Joyology,” an associaƟ on for the promoƟ on of joy and 
happiness through humor and laughter.
20
PAPER PRESENTATION
THE SENTIMENT OF LONELINESS IN PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING:  
EXISTENTIAL SOLITUDE IN E.M.CIORAN AND METHODOLOGY OF THE NEGATIVE IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
by 
Stefania AndreƩ a
Lecce
stefandreƩ a@libero.it
This paper intends to explore the origin of the senƟ ment of solitude emerging in the radical 
nihilism of Emil Cioran and how the philosophy of the negaƟ ve as deconstrucƟ on of universal concepts 
may open new horizons in the reconstrucƟ on of reality and the meaning of life. The philosophy of the 
negaƟ ve can thus help analyze diff erent existenƟ al approaches to solitude in pracƟ cal philosophy. 
For E.M.Cioran, solitude lingers at the end of knowledge and becomes the only real feeling 
aŌ er reality has vanished; the self and the world are swallowed by a total vacuum.
The feeling of cosmic loneliness is an extreme percepƟ on of objecƟ ve empƟ ness. It is the 
vacuum that permeates the universe and separates the self from Ɵ me and from life. Only when 
solitude takes place does the self fi nd signifi cance in an ulƟ mate boredom of the freedom in a 
Ɵ meless and meaningless duraƟ on. Therefore, for E.M. Cioran, awareness of existenƟ al fuƟ lity leads 
to a daily agony where the lucid consciousness destroys any possibility of reconciliaƟ on to life.
Karl Jaspers described “borderline situaƟ ons” as experiences where the loneliness of existence 
is necessary to comprehend the meaning of life. Overcoming the feeling of suff ering through 
interpersonal communicaƟ on bonds, according to Jaspers, is criƟ cal for individual growth and unique 
spiritual discovery and for changing one’s way of thinking, 
For Cioran there is no escape from human suff ering; the only true way to live is to be inacƟ ve 
and refuse any remedy for suff ering. 
Cioran’s brutal and passionate aphorisms describe human feelings in a lucid, raƟ onal fury linked 
to a strong passion for life and the agony of searching for a “divine sign” in the worldly empƟ ness. 
The decomposiƟ on of life and universal beliefs may be the key to transform the paralyzing feeling of 
solitude into a creaƟ onal individual way of living.
Biography
Stefania AndreƩ a graduated in Philosophy at University in Perugia, Italy, in 2002.
Her dissertaƟ on focused on “The Emergency of NegaƟ ve” in the Romanian philosopher Emile 
Cioran (1911–1995).
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PERSONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROJECT OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
by
Veronika Bogdanova 
Chelyabinsk State Pedagogical University
verovictory@mail.ru
In 1784 Immanuel Kant described enlightenment as emancipaƟ on of the person from a 
condiƟ on of infancy perceived as a lack of capacity for independent thinking. In turity does not come 
about at any parƟ cular age, but is rather brought through the person’s preparedness to break through 
the limitaƟ ons imposed by ther infancy. Thus, on a personal and psychological level, enlightenment 
should allow the person to develop a mature personality, guided by a rich mindfulness and asserƟ ve 
in taking the responsibility for one’s own life. I argue in this paper that the formaƟ on of this type 
of personality is a primary goal of philosophical pracƟ ce. Thus philosophical pracƟ ce contains an 
irreducible pedagogical dimension, which emphasizes the development of skills of adaptaƟ ons. 
Philosophical pracƟ ce also naturally emphasizes the need to remove paternalism from educaƟ on 
and popular cultures as a structural impediment to personal growth. Personal enlightenment 
fundamentally rests on the idea of a truth that is not passive; the truth of personal enlightenment is 
not an ‘imparƟ al refl ecƟ on of reality’. Rather it is a guarantor of reliability of individual experience, 
solidifi ed by the person’s mental work, strong-willed eff orts and emoƟ onal experiences.
Biography
Veronika Bogdanova is a candidate of philosophy. She teaches at the Department of Philosophy 
and Cultural Science of Chelyabinsk State Pedagogical University. Her research interests include 
epistemology and ontology, philosophical pracƟ ce, philosophy of educaƟ on and philosophy of 
science. 
22
PAPER PRESENTATION
THE PROJECT OF FACULTY OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR PEDAGOGICAL UNIVERSITY 
by
Sergey Borisov
Chelyabinsk State Pedagogical University 
borisovsv69@mail.ru
Pedagogical educaƟ on is in Russia at a modernizaƟ on stage. Very soon there will be essenƟ al 
changes of higher educaƟ on insƟ tuƟ ons in connecƟ on associated with the introducƟ on of new forms 
of the Bachelor’s degree. The main part of these changes involves building specifi c qualiƟ es into the 
pedagogues which are associated with pracƟ cal skills. They will be required to represent well to 
the students their career and educaƟ onal prospects, be able think creaƟ vely, solve non-standard 
problems, exhibit leadership and be mobile and fl exible in self-educaƟ on and retraining. The new 
Bachelor’s degree will allow students to devote the fi rst two years of their studies to quesƟ ons of self-
determinaƟ on, formaƟ on of self-knowledge and personal growth. The corresponding training will 
focus on developing the ability to think independently and creaƟ vely, to make free and responsible 
decisions, to project eff ecƟ ve interacƟ on between people and numerous other ‘pracƟ cal’ skills. Thus 
the focus of the Faculty of Pedagogy is to assist pedagogy students not only in gaining theoreƟ cal 
knowledge and access to informaƟ on, but also to acquiring pracƟ cal skills that will allow them to 
eff ecƟ vely transfer knowledge and at the same Ɵ me transmit certain ‘life skills’. Such skills will equip 
students well to enter the profession of educaƟ on and will transfer easily across an array of akin 
disciplines. The role of philosophical pracƟ ce in this ‘organic’ concept of educaƟ on will be elucidated 
in some detail by this paper.
Biography
Sergey Borisov has a PhD in Philosophy and is a candidate of cultural science. He is Professor and 
Chair of Philosophy and Cultural Science at the Chelyabinsk State Pedagogical University. His fi elds 
of primary interest include epistemology and ontology, methodology of science and of philosophy, 
philosophical problems of interdisciplinary research, the teaching of philosophy. He is the author of 
several curricula and manuals on pracƟ cal philosophy for children and adults, including “Philosophy 
for Children” (2005), “Philosophical ConversaƟ ons” (2007), “Fundamentals of Philosophy” (2010). 
He is head of the Chelyabinsk offi  ce of public organizaƟ on “Philosophy to Children”. He has authored 
the following monographs: Philosophical PropaedeuƟ cs (Moscow, 2003), The Person Philosophizing 
(Moscow, 2005), and The Epistemology of Naive Philosophizing” (Moscow, 2007). hƩ p://borisovsv.
webnode.com.
23
PAPER PRESENTATION
TREADING THE BOUNDARY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE:
PREFECTIONIST PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
by
Jon Borowicz
Milwaukee School of Engineering
borowicz@msoe.edu
PracƟ cal philosophy embodies two essenƟ al acƟ viƟ es: thinking and dialogue. How are they 
related, and what are their incenƟ ves?  Thinking is private and dialogue, public. This diff erence 
suggests the potenƟ al value of the resources of poliƟ cal theory for the consideraƟ on of pracƟ cal 
philosophy.  Thoughtlessness is a condiƟ on of the bureaucraƟ zed social relaƟ ons of late modernity, 
but how is it a problem as an occasion for pracƟ cal philosophy?  Episodic alienaƟ on from one’s 
decisions and acƟ ons consƟ tutes what Stanley Cavell has called a “perfecƟ onist moment” which 
suggests the opening for philosophical pracƟ ce.  The possibility of a perfecƟ onist philosophical 
pracƟ ce implies that thinking and social relaƟ ons are in tension if not mutually exclusive.  It is 
hopeless for philosophical pracƟ ce to promote thoughƞ ul or mindful living.  Following Heidegger, 
Arendt has argued convincingly that thinking is “out of order” with respect to our workaday lives. 
Thinking must occur at a distance from the acƟ viƟ es of “labor” and “producƟ on.”  Arendt, however, 
has also argued at least once that thinking enables judgment, that in fact judging “inserts” the criƟ cal 
results of thinking into the social world.
Arendt herself pessimisƟ cally reserved the acƟ vity of judging to spectators out of the game, 
essenƟ ally to social criƟ cs such as herself.  Of considerable interest to philosophical pracƟ ce, however, 
is her discussion of judgment and taste in her posthumously published Lectures on Kant’s PoliƟ cal 
Philosophy.  I will argue that the culƟ vaƟ on of moral taste is the appropriate expression of regret 
occasioned by thoughtlessness.  PracƟ cally, I will describe my use of rhetorical formats to this end, 
such as those adduced by Kessels, Boers, and Mostert in Free Space.
Biography
Born in Cleveland, Ohio USA in 1953, Jon Borowicz is Professor of Philosophy at the Milwaukee 
School of Engineering.  He received the BA with major in philosophy from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison in 1975, and the PhD in philosophy from The Johns Hopkins University in 1986 with a 
dissertaƟ on enƟ tled Benefi cence and Decision Making in the Treatment of Meningomyelocele.  AŌ er 
aƩ ending the fi rst ICPP in Vancouver, Borowicz has made presentaƟ ons at most of the subsequent 
conferences.  He established the philosophical pracƟ ce, Therien, in Cedarburg, Wisconsin USA, 
in 1997.  Since 2006, he has concentrated his work in philosophical pracƟ ce in the integraƟ on of 
various forms of philosophical dialogue into his courses in professional ethics, and in the conƟ nuing 
professional educaƟ on of engineers.  He has disseminated the results of this work in presentaƟ ons 
to internaƟ onal conferences in professional ethics.  His recent scholarly work has concerned the 
intersecƟ on of pracƟ cal philosophy and poliƟ cal theory.
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PHILOSOPHY AS A PRACTICE
by
Oscar Brenifi er, 
InsƟ tut de PraƟ ques Philosophiques
alcofrib@club-internet.fr
1. Theory
The concept of pracƟ ce is generally foreign to the philosopher, who is almost exclusively a 
theoreƟ cian. As a professor, his teaching bears principally on a number of wriƩ en texts, the knowledge 
and understanding of which he has to communicate to his students. If he does any wriƟ ng, his main 
area of inquiry will be the history of ideas. A smaller minority of teachers will engage in some kind 
or other of philosophical speculaƟ ons. In this context, over the recent period, somewhat in rupture 
with the tradiƟ on, a relaƟ vely new kind of occupaƟ on has appeared, called philosophical consulƟ ng, 
in general vividly contested by the philosophical insƟ tuƟ on. This situaƟ on poses the following two 
quesƟ ons: what is philosophical and what is not? Is philosophy only a discourse, or does it include 
a pracƟ ce? 
A pracƟ ce can be defi ned as an acƟ vity which confronts a given theory with some kind of 
materiality, or otherness. The most obvious materiality for philosophizing is fi rst the all-encompassing 
world, inclusive of human existence. A world we know in the form of the mythos, of the narraƟ on 
of daily events, or as a logos, in the scaƩ ered form of cultural, scienƟ fi c and technical informaƟ on 
and logical systems. Secondly, the ‘materiality’ in quesƟ on is, for each one of us, ‘the other’, the 
individual with whom we can enter a dialogue or confrontaƟ on. Thirdly, in a sense we also face as 
‘materiality’ the coherence or presumed unity of our own speech, whose fl aws and incompleteness 
oblige us to reach for higher or more complete orders of  mental architecture. 
With those principles in mind, and much inspired by Plato, the author has developed a 
pracƟ ce which consists in exercises challenging the individual thinking, both in a private and group 
situaƟ on, inside or outside of school. The basic form of the method consists, broadly, in a threefold 
acƟ on: the fi rst is to idenƟ fy the presupposiƟ ons of our own thinking. Secondly, the parƟ cipant and 
the interrogator enter into a criƟ cal analysis of the statement(s) made by the parƟ cipant. Thirdly, 
they aƩ empt to imagine and formulate a concept that more adequately captures the general idea 
expressed by the parƟ cipant. In this process, one becomes aware of one’s own views of the world 
and of oneself, deliberates on the possibility of other conceptualizaƟ ons, and engages along an 
anagogic path, where one trespasses one’s own opinion. This type of trespassing is the heart of 
philosophizing. Of course, in this pracƟ ce, the knowledge of classical authors is very useful, but 
not an absolute prerequisite. Whatever the tools used, the overall and main challenge remains the 
consƟ tuƟ ve acƟ vity of a singular mind.
2. Example of pracƟ ce: Individual consultaƟ on
This exercise remains basically a one-to-one discussion. On a given quesƟ on, chosen by the 
interrogator or the parƟ cipant, the parƟ cipant will have to give an iniƟ al hypothesis. He/she will be 
then quesƟ oned by the interrogator, in order to elicit more precision in the meanings expressed, thus 
revealing the ‘blind spots’ and contradicƟ ons of the iniƟ al statement. He is then asked to arƟ culate a 
criƟ cism of his own proposal. As this process goes on, the basic assumpƟ ons by the parƟ cipant, their 
mode of thinking and its formal inadequacies will emerge. The parƟ cipant is then asked to analyze 
the assumpƟ ons and develop a further hypothesis, both on the iniƟ al subject and on the method 
he/she has been using. Then a collecƟ ve analysis will commence with the observers.
Biography
Oscar Brenifi er holds a Bachelor’s degree in Biology (University of OƩ awa) and a PhD ih 
Philosophy from Sorbonne. For many years he has been involved in philosophical pracƟ ce, didacƟ cs 
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of philosophy and philosophy with children, within the school system, in businesses and with the 
general public, through workshops or philosophical consultaƟ on.
He works in France and in numerous other countries: Algeria, China, Bulgaria, Russia, Albania, 
Norway, Lebanon, Syria, USA, etc. He has published numerous arƟ cles and books, including the series 
of textbooks The apprenƟ ce philosopher, a manual for teachers Teaching through discussion and a 
collecƟ on of children’s books Philozenfants ― a library success in over thirty diff erent languages.  For 
many years he has been the Editor of the French journal on didacƟ cs of philosophy DioƟ me l’Agora. 
In 2007 he was commissioned by the UNESCO to write the report on “Non academic philosophy in 
the world”.
Currently Oscar is the chairman of the InsƟ tut de PraƟ ques Philosophiques, and his main 
occupaƟ on is training philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners, business leaders and teachers, from kindergarten 
to university. His website is:  www.brenifi er.com
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PRACTICING PHILOSOPHY IN THE WORKING PLACE. 
BETWEEN UTILITARIANISM AND SHARED METAPHYSICS
by
Oriana Brücker
Geneva
orianabruecker@bluewin.ch
First, they were asking for coaching to write their Code of Ethics. Then, they needed to solve 
ethical dilemmas that they were facing with their clients. Today, they’re quesƟ oning themselves 
by discovering the thoughts of Martha Nussbaum, Hannah Arendt or Plato. And tomorrow? They 
are looking for a teaching about the care they’re actually off ering every day... Why an experienced, 
successful and curious team of social workers is asking for philosophy? What are they fi nding — or 
sƟ ll seeking? The aim of this paper is to describe the evoluƟ on of a 4-year long philosophical pracƟ ce 
within the same team of social workers. While the quesƟ ons and needs of the team have changed 
over the years, something seems to recurr over the sessions, which share concern and quesƟ oning 
between the interlocutors. 
The art of quesƟ oning is the heritage of academic philosophy for the pracƟ ce of philosophy. 
However, philosophical pracƟ ce also has a favor to return to academic philosophy. Some substanƟ ve 
philosophical answers are to be found in the reality of a philosophical session. The philosophy 
pracƟ ced in the working place off ers a model to understand the reality and quesƟ on the mystery on 
life together.
Biography
Oriana Brücker, born in Locarno (Switzerland) is a former parlament writer and current ethics 
teacher. She holds an MA in Philosophy (Lausanne) and DES in Philosophy (Geneva). She has been an 
acƟ ve philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner since 2010. Oriana trained in Philosophy for Children with Michel 
Sasseville and she has engaged in philosophical PracƟ ce with Shlomit Schuster. She is a member of 
the Network for PracƟ cal Philosophizing philopraxis.ch. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING AS A TOOL TO ENHANCE SOCIAL WELLͳBEING
by
Aleksandra Bulatović
InsƟ tute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade
abulatovic@sezampro.rs
The percepƟ on of moral quality is recognised to exert tremendous infl uence over the concerns 
of life. The labeling of human acƟ ons as good or evil has the capacity to signifi cantly alter that 
person’s reality. In the contemporary culture of rights and duƟ es, with its emphasis on legality in the 
arƟ culaƟ on of social relaƟ onships, the execuƟ on of public power typically excludes direct reference 
to moral issues. This is what allows the so-called ’administraƟ ve evil’ to occur within an otherwise 
enƟ rely legal framework of operaƟ on of the public administraƟ on.
The paper explores the capacity of philosophical counseling to contribute to the transformaƟ on 
of public service into a more eff ecƟ ve and humane structure. The paper will present two typical 
cases of the organisaƟ on of the public service, those of Australia and Serbia, and explore the moral 
controveries in both. The paper will argue that philosophical counseling in the public administraƟ on 
enhances the role and profi le of moral labelling, thus both introducing a moral perspecƟ ve to the 
otherwise predominantly legalisƟ c normaƟ ve environment, and at the same Ɵ me changing the 
incenƟ ves structure of public servants by aƩ aching percepƟ ble moral labels fo their acƟ ons. In 
doing so, philosophical counseling has the capacity to enhance the professional ethics of public 
administraƟ on and ulƟ mately posiƟ vely infl uence the lives and social well being of individuals in 
society, who are clients of the public administraƟ on. 
Biography
Aleksandra Bulatović, MA, is Research Associate at the InsƟ tute for Criminological and 
Sociological Research, Belgrade. She acƟ vely parƟ cipates in research projects focusing on human 
rights theory and pracƟ ce. She is currently working on the relaƟ onship between human security and 
the achievement of opƟ mum quality of life. Her recent publicaƟ on is a book on the ethics of criminal 
intelligence. 
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USING APPRECIATIVE INQUIRY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF CODES OF ETHICS
by
Antonio Sandu
“Stefan Cel Mare” University of Suceava
 antonio1907@yahoo.com;
Ana Caras
Lumen Research Centre in Social and HumanisƟ c Sciences
ana.caras.15@gmail.com
Philosophical pracƟ ce within organisaƟ ons may establish a construcƟ ve dimension of the 
appreciaƟ ve organizaƟ onal ethics. AppreciaƟ ve ethics as a philosophical pracƟ ce comes to replace 
the vision on ethics as an exclusively regulatory instance. The knowledge-based organisaƟ on and 
the learning OrganisaƟ on are oriented towards saƟ sfying a fundamental need of the stake holders 
other than the simple profi t. The consƟ tuƟ ve ethical values of the organisaƟ on will generate ethical 
principles of pracƟ ce which will be reunited in the ethical code of the organisaƟ on. This workshop 
targets the ways of idenƟ fying the successful appreciaƟ ve elements as consƟ tuƟ ve and operaƟ onal 
ethical values, followed by their formalisaƟ on in a code of ethics. The workshop outlines the use of 
appreciaƟ ve inquiry in the construcƟ on of codes of ethics in organisaƟ ons and details the stages of 
this process.
Biographies
Antonio SANDU is Professor PhD at “Stefan Cel Mare” University of Suceava, Romania and 
President of Lumen AssociaƟ on since 2001. He has also been the Chairman of the Lumen Publishing 
House since 2004. 
Ana CARAS is research assistant at the Lumen Research Centre in Social and HumanisƟ c 
Sciences and a PhD candidate in Ethics at the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University (Romania). 
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ARGUMENTATION AS AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR THINKING DEVELOPMENT
by
Viktoria Chernenko
InsƟ tute of Philosophical PracƟ ce, Paris
justviƩ a@gmail.com
One of the main diff erences between pracƟ cal and “theoreƟ cal” philosophy is that philosophy 
as a pracƟ ce tries to study more the “how” than the “what”: the content of thought or belief interests 
us much less than the process of thinking itself. We want to study and improve the way people 
think in order to bring in awareness and with it autonomy in their lives, which will results in their 
hightened capacity to deal with various issues that they face. Form in this case is more important 
than the content, structure is more important than what it structures. That’s why fi rst of all there 
should be an aƩ empt to teach children how to think, giving them instruments and developing their 
thinking competencies. Such instruments include, for example: idenƟ fi caƟ on (fi nding the problem), 
problemaƟ saƟ on (examining weak points, criƟ que), conceptualisaƟ on (producing a key term that 
consists the main idea) and, fi nally, argumentaƟ on. 
While I will menƟ on all these competencies, I will focus on one and present in a paper as well 
as in a workshop that will follow the presentaƟ on. The main focus of my presentaƟ on will be the 
idea of working on argumentaƟ on skills as a tool for developing thinking competencies. Argument in 
this case is viewed not as a tool of persuasion, but as the means for deepening an idea and working 
on it in a more rigorous fashion. ArgumentaƟ on can also be considered a tool for evaluaƟ ng and 
understanding the thinking process and one’s own and others’ views and aƫ  tudes. 
Biography
Victoria Chernenko graduated from ‘Moscow Academy for Finance and HumaniƟ es’. Specialty: 
Psychology. She also graduated from Russian State University for the HumaniƟ es. Specialty: Cultural 
and historical psychology. Department: Psychology of educaƟ on. Since autumn 2014 – PhD program 
in Philosophy 
Since 2010 she has been working at the InsƟ tute of Philosophical PracƟ ce (Paris, France) 
and has been developing philosophical pracƟ ce in Russia and abroad (Norway, Turkey, Holland, 
Greece, Germany, Belgium, Thailand, Cambodia), conducƟ ng individual consultaƟ ons and 
facilitaƟ ng workshops with children and adults in the centers of children development, schools, 
universiƟ es, business organizaƟ ons, etc. She is a researcher at the Moscow Research InsƟ tute of 
Child Development. 
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by
Ioannis S. Christodoulou
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What is most important for the enterprise of philosophical therapy is that its objecƟ ves are 
clearly defi ned. In my paper, I explore the potenƟ al benefi ts of philosophy for physical health. I put 
forward the hypothesis that thoughƞ ulness is important both for the equilibrium of the soul and the 
health of the body. From this point of view, I consider the mind–body dichotomy as non-producƟ ve 
for the purpose of iniƟ aƟ ng philosophical therapy as a holisƟ c treatment of life problems.
What could possibly be the bodily status of a philosopher who seeks to give alternaƟ ve meaning 
to everyday noƟ ons? First of all, he escapes the toxic situaƟ on of being confused by unfruiƞ ul or 
erroneous thoughts. Second, he enjoys the serenity of the philosophical avoidance of stressful self-
evaluaƟ ons. And, most importantly, during the philosophical walk of the mind through the desert of 
noƟ ons the body funcƟ ons independently from the mind.
The quesƟ on is whether this conceptualizaƟ on of philosophical therapy could be easily put 
into pracƟ ce. In my opinion, philosophical counseling could be very well guided by such a theoreƟ cal 
perspecƟ ve. The philosophical counselor has to be able to demonstrate the benefi ciary role of 
philosophy for physical health. Secondly, he has to be able to convince his clients that philosophy is 
not only a maƩ er of clarity of thought, but also a maƩ er of healthy living.  
Biography
Dr Ioannis S. Christodoulou is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Department of Classical Studies 
and Philosophy, University of Cyprus. He is also an Instructor – Counselor at Greek Open University. 
Since 2010, he has been Chairman of the Bioethics CommiƩ ee of Biomedical and Clinical Research 
in the Cyprus Ministry of Health. Dr Christodoulou mainly publishes on Metaphysics, History of 
Philosophy, Metaphilosophy and Philosophical PracƟ ce. For the last four years he has been working 
as a Philosopher Counselor as well. 
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THE “GAME OF DEFINING”
by
Bruno Ćurko
InsƟ tute of Philosophy, Zagreb
PeƟ t Philosophy Society, Zadar
mala.fi lozofi ja@gmail.com
This workshop was iniƟ ally designed for work with children and young people in the various 
programs of AssociaƟ on “PeƟ t Philosophy”, however it is useful when working with any age group. 
The “Game of Defi ning” is a very simple workshop. First parƟ cipant choose a concept. Then they 
must fi nd other concepts that are closely linked with the concept that they aƩ empt to defi ne. AŌ er 
they idenƟ fy 10–12 mutually linked concepts, we start a discussion about each and its connecƟ on 
with ‘the main concept’. In the discussion the parƟ cipants must decide which of these concepts 
are essenƟ al for ‘the main concept’ and which ones are not. When the discussion about connected 
concepts fi nishes, the second part of the workshop starts. In this part, parƟ cipants try to defi ne ‘the 
main concept’ via concepts that are strongly connected with ‘the main concept’, however by using 
only the concepts that have not been rejected in the fi rst part of the workshop. In this phase the 
parƟ cipants usually reject one or more addiƟ onal concepts that had remained from the fi rst part of 
the workshop, and bring in some new concepts. In the end we try to establish a defi niƟ on of ‘the 
main concept’ which is clear, logically well structured and meaningful. The defi niƟ on is considered 
fi nalized when more than a half of the parƟ cipants agree with it.
Biography
Bruno Ćurko obtained his doctor’s degree at the Faculty of HumaniƟ es and Social Studies, 
University of Zagreb on the topic ‘CriƟ cal thinking in teaching philosophy, logic and ethics’. Between 
1997 and 2006 he had worked in several high schools as a teacher of philosophy, logic, ethics, LaƟ n, 
poliƟ cs, economy and mythology. Since 2006 he has been employed at the InsƟ tute of Philosophy 
in Zagreb. He was program co-director of the internaƟ onal conference ‘PerspecƟ ve of philosophy’, 
organized by the CroaƟ an Philosophical Society in Zagreb in 2013. He is also the founder and President 
of the AssociaƟ on PeƟ t philosophy (www.peƟ t-philosphy.com) and co-author of the programs and 
projects of this AssociaƟ on. PeƟ t philosophy has several projects for developing criƟ cal thinking in 
children and youths, but also programs for adults. Some of these projects are supported by the 
European Commission, CroaƟ an Ministry of Science, EducaƟ on and Sport and private companies. 
Since 24th October 2012 Bruno has been the secretary of SOPHIA — the European FoundaƟ on for the 
Advancement of Doing Philosophy with Children. He published arƟ cles and books.
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OUT OF THE SHADOW PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 
AS A LABORATORY OF GENDER IDENTITY
by
Luisa de Paula
University of Urbino
luisa.dep@Ɵ n.it
Gender idenƟ ty is undergoing a deep crisis. Men, no less than women, are seeking new roles 
and balances. Neither psychoanalysis nor feminist theory provide adequate tools to deal with their 
need for a radical change. In my presentaƟ on I argue that philosophical pracƟ ce opens the fi eld for 
rethinking gender while valuing the diff érance within the two sexes. I will show that the atavisƟ c and 
persistent defi niƟ on of the female within a perspecƟ ve of hierarchical insubordinaƟ on penalises 
both women and men, aff ecƟ ng the enƟ re idenƟ tarian spectrum of the human being. This explains 
why gender idenƟ ty spontaneously rises from within philosophical pracƟ ces as its core issue, and 
not just as one among many others.
Biography
An APPA cerƟ fi ed member, Luisa de Paula received her educaƟ on in Italy, France, the UK and the 
US. AŌ er compleƟ ng her BAs in Philosophy and Journalism, she aƩ ended a three years postgraduate 
school in Philosophical PracƟ ce while managing experimental projects in schools, hospitals, 
universiƟ es, and social cooperaƟ ves. In 2012 she completed a PhD through a joint supervision Italy-
France. She is currently ediƟ ng a book with Peter Raabe on the topic of her presentaƟ on.
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TWO CONCEPTIONS OF HAPPINESS: FLOURISHING AND FEELING HAPPY 
by
Dimitrios Dentsoras
Department of Philosophy
University of Manitoba
Dimitrios Dentsoras@umanitoba.ca
The essay invesƟ gates the relaƟ onship between the two prominent concepƟ ons of happiness: 
(i) happiness as a value term denoƟ ng an objecƟ vely and intrinsically valuable quality (oŌ en referred 
to as well-being or fl ourishing), and (ii) happiness as a subjecƟ ve feeling, usually associated with, and 
arising from, an assessment of one’s current state. Philosophers have tradiƟ onally been occupied 
with the fi rst kind of happiness, while psychologists have been focusing more on the subjecƟ ve 
feeling of happiness (and, more oŌ en, unhappiness). Neither of the two groups has made a serious 
aƩ empt to bring the two noƟ ons together, by explaining their interacƟ on. Rather, each tends to 
favor one of the concepts, and to dismiss the other as either insignifi cant or misleading. I aƩ empt 
to bridge the two concepƟ ons of happiness, starƟ ng with a discussion of ancient philosophical 
debates on the relaƟ onship between well-being (eudaimonia) and pleasure (the concept nearest to 
contemporary subjecƟ ve feelings of happiness). Ancient philosophers placed the greatest emphasis 
on well-being. Their argument was oŌ en based on the thought that what we really want is to be 
truly/objecƟ vely happy, and not merely to feel happy. I maintain that this is a powerful argument, 
which, nevertheless, fails when one considers people’s actual moƟ ves to choice and acƟ on. Usually, 
what moƟ vates people is an immediate or expected feeling, rather than an objecƟ ve assessment 
of what kind of life is more intrinsically worthy. I end with some suggesƟ ons on how the interplay 
between the two concepƟ ons of happiness can be used in posiƟ vely aff ecƟ ng people’s aƫ  tudes 
towards their own lives. 
Biography
Dimitrios Dentsoras is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Manitoba in 
Winnipeg, Canada. I received my PhD from the Program in Classical Philosophy at Princeton University. 
My research interests include ancient philosophy, moral psychology, and ethics. I am parƟ cularly 
interested in philosophical and popular concepƟ ons of happiness, and in their interacƟ ons, both in 
a historical and in a contemporary context
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BIRTH TO DERRIDA’S MOTHER:
PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AT THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
by
Helen Douglas
Philosophy in PracƟ ce
PO Box 99, Kalk Bay 7990
 helen@philosophy-pracƟ ce.co.za
When we judge the violence of previous centuries and the burgeoning crises of the twenty-
fi rst, we must wonder how Western philosophy is implicated. This was a crucial quesƟ on for the 
French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, whose intuiƟ on was that ‘the soluƟ on’ did not require 
‘a change in the principles of this civilisaƟ on’, but was perhaps a maƩ er of ‘giving a central role to 
elements that were on the sidelines’ and ‘changing the balance within this civilisaƟ on between the 
basic theme of knowledge and the basic theme of the relaƟ onship with the Other’. Following Levinas, 
this paper discusses related imbalances in the dominant mode of Western thought, including the 
insƟ tuƟ on of inequality and the marginalisaƟ on of ‘the feminine’ (more properly, the non-masculine). 
The paper also recommends an anƟ dote: a pracƟ ce of thinking-with-others that interrupts 
and counteracts philosophy-s violent tendencies. One ingredient is Levinas-s noƟ on of ethical 
intersubjecƟ vity. Another is an expansion of the radical equality presented by Jacques Rancière in The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual EmancipaƟ on. A pracƟ ce that is grounded in these 
views engages with parƟ cular persons in their parƟ cular circumstances and is open to exploring the 
enƟ re situaƟ on, including the poliƟ cal, social and historical condiƟ ons. Beyond therapy, it becomes 
an emancipatory pracƟ ce towards the recovery of our basic humanness and dignity.
The pracƟ ce does not, however, become philosophy. It lacks that virility and ambiƟ on. 
Embracing qualiƟ es that have been ‘on the sidelines’, relegated to the female and not explicitly 
thought, it loves wisdom and seeks truth but refracts the logoi of technique and method. It prefers 
conversaƟ on to argument, is poeƟ c and deeply discreet. It may just be the concepƟ on of ‘a thinking 
mother’ (Jacques Derrida’s charming image of a ‘post-deconstrucƟ ve philosopher’).
References
Derrida. DVD. Directed by Kirby Dick and Amy ZieringKofman, 2002. 
Jane Doe Films.kirbydick.com/derrida/DerridaTRANSCRIPT.doc.
Levinas, E. DVD. Interview by France Guwy for Dutch Television, 1986.
Biography
Helen Douglas (MA Stellenbosch, 2002; BGS Simon Fraser, 1997) is the author of Love and Arms: 
Violence and JusƟ fi caƟ on aŌ er Levinas (PiƩ sburgh: Trivium PublicaƟ ons, 2010), which explores the 
ethics of violence. She has also published several arƟ cles on the intersecƟ on of ethics, poliƟ cs and 
therapy, and guest-edited a special issue on Philosophical PracƟ ces for the journal Janus Head (8:2, 
2005). She received an MA (cum laude) in philosophy from the University of Stellenbosch, South 
Africa in 2002 and a Bachelor of General Studies from Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada 
in 1997. She has conducted a philosophical pracƟ ce in Cape Town since 2002, off ering counselling to 
individuals and couples as well as a monthly philosophy café.
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RECOGNISING THE CONFLICT IN PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING:
WHAT CAN HEGEL CONTRIBUTE TO CONFLICTͳRESOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE?
by
Aleksandar FaƟ ć
Research Professor, InsƟ tute for Philosophy and Social Theory
University of Belgrade
aleksandar.faƟ c@gmail.com
The paper discusses the potenƟ al of Hegel’s early views on ‘recogniƟ on’ as the dynamic 
foundaƟ on of confl ict, which were made philosophically famous through the interpretaƟ on of Axel 
Honneth, to assist philosophical counseling aimed at confl ict resoluƟ on on various levels, ranging 
from the family to the workplace or relaƟ ons between social groups.
Hegel’s basic idea is that confl icts are a form of recogniƟ on-seeking on all levels; however 
their appearance in everyday life, and their emoƟ onal charge for all the parƟ es involved make 
them appear as destrucƟ ve and socially undesirable events. I argue in this paper that the modern 
strategies of pracƟ cal confl ict-resoluƟ on, such as that developed by Johan Galtung and his followers, 
which emphasise de-escalaƟ on and a quest for common ground and do not rule out the ‘freezing’ of 
confl icts unƟ l adequate circumstances for their resoluƟ on are available, miss the Hegelian point of 
confl icts. Thus they fail to contribute to a full understanding of the conceptual foundaƟ ons of most 
confl icts and of ways to address them as dimensions of human existence.
In the concluding secƟ on of the paper I suggest ways in which philosophical counseling can 
be seen as the ideal format under which to approach the resoluƟ on of confl icts as structures grown 
from recogniƟ on-seeking. I argue that the opƟ mal result of such philosophical ‘confl ict resoluƟ on’ 
need not necessarily and always be a removal of the confl ict; rather what maƩ ers is that the confl ict 
is conceptualized by reference to the parƟ es’ needs and existenƟ al prospects in the community. I 
thus argue that a peaceful and prosperous community is not necessarily one without confl icts, but 
rather one where confl icts are allocated a proper place in people’s self-percepƟ ons and percepƟ ons 
of others.
Biography
Aleksandar FaƟ ć is a philosopher whose main interests lie in the theory of values and applied 
ethics. He has worked extensively in the applicaƟ ons of value theory and ethics to various professional 
fi elds, including those of the public administraƟ on, the security and intelligence professions. He is 
the author of several books on the ethics of public policy, including Punishment and RestoraƟ ve 
Crime—Handling: A Social Theory of Trust (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995); Crime and Social Control in 
‘Central’-Eastern Europe: A Guide to Theory and PracƟ ce (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997); ReconciliaƟ on 
via the War Crimes Tribunal? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), Freedom and Heteronomy: An Essay on 
the Liberal Society (Belgrade: InsƟ tute of InternaƟ onal PoliƟ cs and Economics, 2009), and The ad 
hoc InternaƟ onal War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment (with Klaus Bachmann, Londong: Routledge, 
forthcoming 2015). He is a Fellow and CerƟ fi ed Client Counselor with the American AssociaƟ on 
of Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners and a member of numerous professional bodies. He also serves on 
Belgrade Univerity’s Professional Ethics CommiƩ ee for the period 2014–2017).
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THE NEW ROLE OF THE SEMINARY PHILOSOPHER AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTITIONER 
by
Vaughn J. Fayle
St. Isidore’s College, Rome; Lecturer, Antonianum University
vjfayle9@gmial.com
Since the 13th century students of theology, students for ministry in various denominaƟ ons 
and professional religious scholars have been trained in the rigorous discipline of philosophy.  This 
program of logic and criƟ cal thinking was oŌ en helpful when understanding the changing social 
ideologies in the medieval period.Sadly, philosophy today is increasingly undervalued by many 
universiƟ es in the world and ranks as one of the most unhelpful degrees when compared with a 
master’s of public health or a master’s in social work.  And yet, all over the world, former seminary 
philosophy students are placed daily in pracƟ cal situaƟ ons, in war-torn areas of the world with religious 
and social confl icto and urgent medical concerns. Unlike academic professional philosophers, they 
do not live in ivory towers. The quesƟ on remains: how does one transform tradiƟ onal philosophical 
training in seminaries into a more relevant, interdisciplinary method allowing philosophy students 
to funcƟ on as ‘philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners’ who use criƟ cal and intellectual tools to understand the 
dilemmas people face in today’s world? This presentaƟ on will fi rst trace the history of academic 
philosophy in seminaries, show why this system is inadequate, and then proceed to 5 models for a 
new style of philosophical educaƟ on based on a philosophical-pracƟ ce-model applicable to concerns 
of the internaƟ onal community today. 
Biography
Born and educated in South Africa, Vaughn Jerome Fayle holds degrees in musicology, theology 
and philosophy from European universiƟ es. He has been director and professor of philosophical 
studies at two schools of theology in the USA for the past 22 years. He has also served as associate 
director for the University of Illinois at Chicago Center on Human Responses to Social Catastrophes. 
His research in applying the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz and Merleau-Ponty has led him 
to construct social philosophical methods for immigrants, refugees and persons with disabiliƟ es in 
the world today.  He is resident scholar at St. Isidore’s College in Rome, Italy and teaches philosophy 
at the Antonianum University.
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SPIRITUALITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE: 
GROUP COUNSELING WITH CLIENTS IN CRISIS
by
Vaughana Feary
APPA Vice- President and CFO
Program Director, Excalibur: A Center for Applied Ethics
Recent academic philosophy has had liƩ le to say about the concept of spirituality, but 
philosophical tradiƟ ons of spirituality are useful in philosophical pracƟ ce because they can serve 
to suggest ways for our clients to lead richer and more deeply philosophical lives. Moreover, there 
is a dialecƟ cal interplay between academic theory and philosophical pracƟ ce for pracƟ ce oŌ en 
demonstrates that theory requires modifi caƟ on or extension. 
Spirituality is a way of being in the world which involves predisposiƟ ons to relate to the world 
in terms of parƟ cular transcendent ideas, values and pracƟ ces. It has connecƟ ons to specifi c themes 
in various philosophical and wisdom tradiƟ ons which include:  Platonic and Neoplatonic stages 
of enriched understanding; Stoic views of serenity; Phenomenological and Hindu concepƟ ons of 
experiencing the sacred; ChrisƟ an and analyƟ c views of hope and forgiveness; KanƟ an, Buddhist, 
and Feminist approaches to community: Kant’s noƟ on of the sublime; and Transcendentalist and 
NaƟ ve American concepƟ ons of nature  
Philosophical exploraƟ ons of “spirituality” and its related themes can be therapeuƟ cally 
valuable in working with groups in crisis. Aside from being intrinsically valuable, philosophical 
exploraƟ ons of spiritual dimensions of living can reduce stress, provide coping strategies at Ɵ mes 
of tragedy, and improve quality of life for those in crisis. The workshop accompanying this paper 
will show how to sƟ mulate dialogue about spirituality and conduct group exercises designed for 
corporaƟ ons, hospitals, rehabilitaƟ on centers, substance abuse clinics, senior centers etc.
Biography
Vaughana Feary received her Ph.D. from the University of Arizona n 1979. Her areas of 
specializaƟ on are: Legal, Moral and Social PoliƟ cal Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, and Philosophical 
PracƟ ce . She is reƟ red from teaching philosophy at Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison Campus. 
She is a former President of the Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy (ASPCP) and 
current Vice President of the American Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners AssociaƟ on (APPA)  and one of its 
founding Board members. She serves as  Program Director for Excalibur: A Center for Applied Ethics. 
She is sƟ ll doing consulƟ ng work for corporaƟ ons, hospitals, correcƟ onal faciliƟ es and museums.
Vaughana has worked in correcƟ onal faciliƟ es designing and delivering  programs for adult 
and juvenile off enders for over 13 years and was the fi rst philosopher to consult in this area. Her 
most recent arƟ cle in this area is “Philosophical Therapy in CorrecƟ onal FaciliƟ es” in The Journal 
of HumaniƟ es Therapy, Vol 4, December 14. She was also one of the fi rst philosophers to do 
philosophical counseling with cancer paƟ ents and to design and deliver programs for cancer centers. 
One of her best known arƟ cles in this area is “Medicine for the Soul: Philosophical Counseling with 
Cancer PaƟ ents” in ed. Henning Herrestad, Anders Holt and Helge Svare, Philosophy in Society , Oslo 
Norway: Unipub Fourlag, 2002. She has published extensively in Business Ethics and organizaƟ onal 
consulƟ ng. Her background and approach to philosophical pracƟ ce are described in ed. JeaneƩ e 
Bresson Ladegaard Knox, Philosophical PracƟ ce. AutomaƟ c Press, 2013.
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MASTERCLASS
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING
by
Vaughana Feary 
vfeary@aol.com
Lou Marinoff 
City College of New York
lou.marinoff @appa.edu
This Master Class will be a 3-hour workshop, devoted either
(1) to analysis and discussion of case studies submiƩ ed by philosophical counselors; or,
(2) to live supervision of actual counseling sessions (no role playing).
OpƟ on (1) approximately 6-8 case studies will be selected for this 3-hour workshop. 
In order to be considered for selecƟ on, case studies must be submiƩ ed via email, as MS-Word 
aƩ achments, to Vaughana Feary and Lou Marinoff , no later than June 10, 2014. 
Their email addresses are vfeary@aol.com and lou.marinoff @appa.edu
Each case study should embody (most or all of) the following elements, should be wriƩ en in 
English, and should have a length of 1,000 – 1,500 words.
Relevant history
Nature of problem or process
Main philosophical issue
Method (if any) and heurisƟ c for selecƟ on
Philosophical idea(s) that were helpful
How was main issue managed or resolved?
Other relevant issues?
Other observaƟ ons
RelaƟ ons to theory or case literature extant
ParƟ cipants in this Master Class can expect to gain perspecƟ ve on both theories and methods 
of philosophical counseling, not only as applied to the selected cases, but as applicable to a range 
of cases beyond those treated in the alloƩ ed Ɵ me. SubmiƩ ed cases may also be considered for 
publicaƟ on in Philosophical PracƟ ce: Journal of the APPA.
OpƟ on (2) Three volunteer philosophical counselors will, in turn, counsel three diff erent 
volunteer clients during the Master Class. They will be observed and supervised by Profs. Feary and 
Marinoff , who will provide commentary and feedback. Discussions will ensue.  
Biographies
Vaughana Feary is an APPA co-Founder and Vice President. She has pioneered philosophical 
counseling in the corporate world, for incarcerated populaƟ ons, and for cancer paƟ ents. 
Lou Marinoff  is APPA’s founding president, and professor of philosophy at The City College of 
New York. He is a well-known philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner and author.
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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AND ΈMYΉ LIFE EXPERIENCE
by
Willi Fillinger
Zurlindenstrasse 191, CH-8003 Zürich
philopraxis@kopfvoran.ch
It must have been in 1981 or 1982 that I read in the German magazine „Der Spiegel“ about a 
young philosopher who opened the fi rst philosophical pracƟ ce: Gerd Achenbach. My reacƟ on was 
very clear: one day I would also open a philosophical pracƟ ce because this fi Ʃ ed my understanding 
of philosophy. But at the same Ɵ me I thought: I cannot yet do it now because all I have seen unƟ l 
now have been schools as a student and teacher on various levels. So I ‘went pregnant’ with the 
idea for more than 12 years. In 1995 I opened my own philosophical pracƟ ce in Zurich. What had 
happened in the meanƟ me?
From 1985 Ɵ ll 1990 I worked as a delegate of the InternaƟ onal CommiƩ ee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in the Philippines, in Mozambique and in Peru, three countries which suff ered under an 
internal armed confl ict (two confl icts in the Philippines). As a delegate of the ICRC I tried to convince 
all the parƟ es involved to respect the rules of the humanitarian law which was in fact a minimal 
ethics in wars and armed confl icts. For this purpose I spoke to offi  cers and soldiers, leaders and 
fi ghters of the guerilla but also to civilian people down to the poorest peasants and fi shermen. We 
also visited the poliƟ cal prisoners with the aim that they would not be mistreated and that they had 
decent condiƟ ons of detenƟ on. 
The return to Switzerland was not easy. I had an accident and did not fi nd a job: I was unemployed 
and had to register at the labour offi  ce. But soon I was employed by the labour offi  ce itself because 
the unemployment grew rapidly during this period of Ɵ me. As a counsellor for quesƟ ons of further 
educaƟ on and training (Weiterbildung) I spoke with dozens or even hundreds of jobless people. 
With these experiences, ICRC and labour offi  ce, and many others, I was not only someone who 
knew much more about the world then before, but I was another person and had therefore another 
standpoint in the world. However, to bring all this together, especially philosophy and experience, 
was not easy and it is not easy unƟ l today. I am sƟ ll working on it, like everybody else.
The quesƟ ons, however, remain very interesƟ ng and very important: How important is our own 
experience for our work in philosophical pracƟ ce? How do they really interact, namely philosophical 
refl ecƟ ons (or concepts) and the immediacy of percepƟ on and acƟ on? How do they infl uence one 
another? Is it possible to create a synthesis? 
Willy Fillinger’s biography is sketched in his workshop abstract.
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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AND SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE
by
Guido Giacomo GaƩ ai
viale MaƩ eoƫ  , 27 – Florence 
guidogiacomo@gmail.com
First published in 1967 in France, Guy Debord ‘The Society of Spectacle’ remains one of the 
most widely read and commented books in the world of philosophy and sociology. Intellectuals and 
arƟ sts like Baudrillard in France or Bauman in Poland have made strong links between their analyses 
of society and the Debordian one. There are several main ways in which spectacle is present in our 
lives. Television has changed our world completely, thus also changing philosophical debates. Just 
as Socrates was facing wriƩ en paper and Debord was facing the shining screen, nowadays we have 
to deal with the internet and smartphones — in one word, with a completely ‘connected’ life. We 
could say that the youngest generaƟ ons have almost no life outside ‘the net’. It is with those people 
that we as pracƟ Ɵ oners have to philosophise. Furthermore, it is within this kind of life that we must 
philosophise with ourselves and organise our careers. What is philosophy today? Has it changed? 
Is it alive? Is it exactly the same as before? Can we perhaps go back to philosophical pracƟ ce more 
easily now than before? Or is philosophy dying with the shortening aƩ enƟ on spans of most people? 
I do not want to give a single answer but I would like to bring out some experience from my daily 
work with teenagers and discussed it so as to fi nd ideas, soluƟ ons and instruments to start on the 
long road of what I believe is the inevitable confrontaƟ on between philosophical pracƟ ce and the 
society of spectacle.
Biography
Guido Giacomo GaƩ ai was born in Fiesole on 17 August 1981, from a family of teachers. Thanks 
to a Swiss aunt he speaks French at home from the very beginning, and his parents hire a New 
Zealand nurse to let him speak English right away. Raised by a philosopher grandfather (Roberto 
G. Salvadori), when he was 6 years old he began studying theater acƟ ng and when he turned 14 
he opened his fi rst theater company (La Rosa Nera) and published his fi rst story in the newspaper 
L’Unità. AŌ er the success of some apartment theater in Florence, at 17 he enrolled in the fi lm school 
Imagine of Giuseppe Ferlito, where he graduated two years later in movie direcƟ ng. At age of 19 
he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy of Florence where he graduated in Moral Philosophy and 
specialized in History of Philosophy of Renaissance. During the years of specializaƟ on he follows 
a master’s degree in Eastern and ComparaƟ ve Philosophy in Rimini and then one in Philosophical 
PracƟ ce in Paris, with Oscar Brenifi er. In 2005, in Florence, during his university years, he founded 
the hyronist movement, a sƟ ll alive philosophical movement, the web television HyronisTV and the 
fesƟ val of philosophy of Florence (FilosoFesƟ val) both also sƟ ll alive.
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THE PREACHER ͷ TEACHING AND LEARNING
by
Audrey Gers
InsƟ tute for Philosophical PracƟ ce, Paris
audreygers@yahoo.fr
In this story, Nasruddin is a travelling imam. During his peregrinaƟ on, he stops by a small town 
where the local imam just died. Hearing he is a preacher, a group of faithful comes to get him in 
order to give the Friday sermon. But Nasruddin does not really want to do it; he feels Ɵ red, lazy, and 
he declines the invitaƟ on. But the people insist forcefully, they really want to hear the truth of the 
good words, so Nasruddin fi nally accepts, grumbling. Once on the pulpit, he asks ‘Dear brothers, 
do you know what I will talk about?’ And of course, being good Muslims, everybody answers in one 
voice: ‘Yes!’ So Nasruddin replies: ‘Well then, there is no use for me to stay here!’ and he leaves. 
But the people, frustrated of the good word, fetch him once more in spite of his resistance.  Once 
at the mosque, he asks again the quesƟ on ‘Do you know what I will talk about?’, and everyone, 
remembering the previous Ɵ me, answers ‘No!’. To this, Nasruddin replies with a tone of anger: ‘Then 
what I am doing with such a bunch of ignorants, infi dels and pagans!’, and he leaves in a huff . But 
the faithful, unfl agging, although somewhat irritated by now, fetch him once again, and in spite 
of his protests force him to come back for the third Ɵ me. Everybody is now geƫ  ng ready for the 
terrible quesƟ on. ‘Well, do you know what I will talk about?’ asks he dramaƟ cally. But the faithful 
are confused. ‘Yes!’ shouts half the crowd. ‘No!’ shouts the other half of the crowd. So Nasruddin 
concludes: ‘Well I propose that the ones who know explain everything to the ones who don’t know!’ 
and he leaves.   
Work to do for the parƟ cipants: 
to write a moral of the story on a paper; To give an argument in one sentence for which 
reason we deduce this moral; to fi nd one concept synthesizing the moral; write it; to collect several 
concepts on the wriƟ ng board; to select the two most uƟ lized (by making links between them and 
checking their frequency in the group); to divide the group into two groups: one concept to work for 
each group; to fi nd one moral by group: two morals in total; to write the two morals on the wriƟ ng 
board; to criƟ cize them, in a collecƟ ve discussion;
at the end, to check who has kept their idea (moral wriƩ en at the beginning on the paper), who 
has changed theirs. One principle of the pracƟ ce of philosophy is to fi nd a teacher in anyone and at 
the same Ɵ me to make somebody realize by themselves that they can be a teacher. To achieve this 
cooperaƟ on between individuals is required. This cooperaƟ on will allow us to risk a hypothesis to 
think about, or to give up perhaps, to make the thinking move at least, by puƫ  ng in quesƟ on some 
points which at fi rst seem to be taken for granted. The teacher is the one who knows something; 
however this knowledge is about to change at the moment it is transmiƩ ed from the teacher to 
the student. Why? Because with its transmission, knowledge no longer belongs to the same person 
and this changes the value of it. Is the knowledge sƟ ll the property of the teacher, or is it now the 
property of the student? Perhaps the same knowledge is possessed equally by the teacher and the 
student?
Whatever the answer to any of these quesƟ ons is, it draws our aƩ enƟ on to the legiƟ macy of 
knowledge and enlightens our connecƟ on to it.
Biography
Audrey Gers, French philosopher-pracƟ Ɵ oner, has been developing her pracƟ ce with Oscar Brenifi er 
and Isabelle Millon at the InsƟ tute of Philosophical PracƟ ce for eight years, near Paris.
She pracƟ ces the art of quesƟ oning, like Socrates did in Ancient Greece: tesƟ ng the strength of one’s 
opinion, problemaƟ zing it so as to get some truth from it, while teaching others how to achieve a 
fl exible view of the world.
In parallel, she works at promoƟ ng philosophy and the moderaƟ on of philosophical workshops 
in France and abroad.
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PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL PLURALISM
by
Ora Gruengard
Shenkar College of Engineering and Design, Ramat Gan
orag@mail.shenkar.ac.il; 
ora.gruengard@gmail.com
Pluralism, which is nowadays the slogan of cultural studies as well as liberal democraƟ c poliƟ cs, 
is jusƟ fi able by many philosophical reasons. The same reasons seem to jusƟ fy pluralism in philosophy 
itself. ‘Culture’, however, is a very abstract and fuzzy concept: The members of a concrete cultural 
group ‘play’, in WiƩ genstein’s terms, only in some of the ‘language-games’ that form together 
its culture. As the resemblance between those ‘games’ is only a ‘family resemblance’, tahere can 
be no agreement among ‘essenƟ alists’ that try to defi ne the culture’s ‘basic concepts’. The claim 
that ‘democracy’ is a culturally-dependent noƟ on that may be open to pluralisƟ c interpretaƟ ons is 
therefore debatable: The actual meaning of that claim is that liberal democracy fi ts only Western 
capitalisƟ c socieƟ es.  A ‘culturally-dependent’ interpretaƟ on that is not Western might therefore 
serve as an excuse for the imposiƟ on of the ‘essenƟ alist’ version of a democraƟ cally elected non-
liberal party on the enƟ re society, and a despoƟ c interference with the freedom of ciƟ zen that prefser 
‘games’ that according to that version are incompaƟ ble with the alleged ‘essence’ of the culture. I 
might, moreover, lead to the prohibiƟ on of ‘games’ that may give the groups that disagree with that 
version a chance to win in future elecƟ ons. ‘Philosophy’ is similarly fuzzy. There is no agreement 
among Western philosophers which theories, discursive acƟ viƟ es and pracƟ ces that are classifi ed as 
under ‘philosophy’ in some or other Western university are ‘really philosophical’, and many of those 
philosophers tolerate the teaching of non Western ideas and discourses as ‘philosophy’ as long as it 
occurs in the department that is dedicated to studies of their respecƟ ve culture, but would not allow 
it in the department of (‘general’) philosophy. Those who criƟ cized that parochialism are right. But 
those who claim that philosophy is culturally-dependent, and claim that the Western philosophical 
tradiƟ on fi ts only ‘Western kind of raƟ onality’, oŌ en suggest a ‘return’ to a real or idealized tradiƟ onal 
worldview or ethics that was allegedly forsaken or forgoƩ en under the impact of modern Western 
infl uence. They suggest it in the name of pluralism and liberaƟ on, but as long as they do not see 
the allegedly Western (and other ‘foreign’) ideas as an opƟ on and a challenge, in front of which the 
tradiƟ onal ideas should be criƟ cally examined, and do not take the Westerns (and other ‘foreigners’) 
as partners to a dialogue, they are neither pluralists nor philosophers. Philosophical counseling, a sƟ ll 
fuzzier term, seems to be even more pluralisƟ c. But counselors that enter into the fi elds of mysƟ cism 
and religious preaching, meditaƟ on and allegedly logical or spiritual exercises, on the one hand, or 
those of psychotherapy, bridging mediaƟ on or achievement-directed coaching, on the other hand, 
go beyond the borders of philosophical discourse. Although a democraƟ c and pluralisƟ c approach 
seems to condemn any interference with the freedom of the pracƟ Ɵ oner to form his own approach, 
it is important to remember that liberalism that does not allow debates, and tolerance that does 
not tolerate criƟ cism is not part of the ‘language games’ of the philosophical culture.  In the present 
paper I dedicate my criƟ cism to the idea of culturally-dependent concepƟ on of philosophy as a basis 
for philosophical counseling, and invite the parƟ cipants to a debate.
Biography 
Ora Gruengard studied philosophy and economics (BA, MA) at the Hebrew University   of 
Jerusalem (Israel), conƟ nued with advanced philosophical studies at the universiƟ es   of Lille and 
of Paris (France), and got the PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.   Years later, while I 
was teaching philosophy, I studied at Tel Aviv university general   (BA) and cogniƟ ve psychology 
at the graduate level. I started my research on   psychoanalysis in its cultural context during my 
stay in New York in the eighƟ es. With a   growing interest in counseling and a diminishing faith in 
‘clinical’ psychology, I studied   family therapy at Barkai InsƟ tute in Israel, but, despite my growing 
convicƟ on that   the ‘arsenal’ of philosophical tools was much richer than those adapted by ‘clinical 
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psychologists’, I sƟ ll believed that I had to comply with the formal demands from   licensed ‘therapists’. 
I therefore parƟ cipated in pracƟ cal ‘clinical’ work at clinics within  and outside mental hospitals in the 
framework of a program towards a ‘clinical degree’. Before starƟ ng my career of teaching philosophy 
I worked as a research economist in Israel and in France. I taught philosophy at several insƟ tutes, in 
Israel and abroad, mainly at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, and lately, at 
Shenkar College for Engineering and Design. I am pracƟ cing philosophical counseling  since 1992.
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  CAN PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING BE TAUGHT?
by
Ora Gruengard
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orag@mail.shenkar.ac.il
ora.gruengard@gmail.com
 The quesƟ on whether knowledge can be taught was raised by thinkers as diff erent as Plato 
and the Zen Buddhists. Plato’s claim that the student of mathemaƟ cs is reminded of his ‘forgoƩ en 
knowledge’ is dubious. (The Platonic pretence to know what a soul allegedly knows before its 
incarnaƟ on is as unjusƟ fi ed as the psychoanalyst pretence to know the paƟ ent’s unconscious wishes 
that were unconsciously repressed in his infancy). The Zen guru’s convicƟ on that the student fi nds 
alone the ‘right’ way is also debatable (His suggesƟ ve impact is as strong as that of the psychologist’s 
on the paƟ ent’s ‘discovery’ of his unconscious beliefs.) But just as the dictaƟ on of mathemaƟ cal 
theorems does not make the student a mathemaƟ cian and telling what Zen Buddhism is about does 
not turn the hearer into a Zen Buddhist, reading philosophical book does not create philosophers, 
and teaching philosophical ‘techniques’ of counseling does not form philosophical counselors. 
To know mathemaƟ cs is to be able to perform mathemaƟ cal acƟ ons and be able to demonstrate 
the truth, falsity or indemonstrability of mathemaƟ cal proposiƟ ons; to be a mathemaƟ cian is to 
be able, over and above the former, to discover and demonstrate new mathemaƟ cal theorems or 
methods. To understand Zen Buddhism is to be able to fi nd the Zen way of acƟ ng and reacƟ ng in new 
situaƟ ons. Knowing philosophy is not only being acquainted with philosophical theories, but also being 
able to argue for or against such theories, and take part in conceptual analyses and the exploraƟ on 
of the philosophical presupposiƟ ons or implicaƟ ons of non-philosophical texts. Being a philosopher 
is, furthermore, asking philosophical quesƟ ons and examining personally possible answers and 
choosing deliberately the personal philosophical posiƟ on. The mathemaƟ cian, the Zen Buddhist and 
the philosopher owe a lot to the ideas of others; but they develop by taking personally acƟ ve part 
in the exploraƟ on, elecƟ on and elaboraƟ on of ideas or ways of life. As philosophy is a domain of 
quesƟ ons to which there is more than one answer, the philosopher, unlike the mathemaƟ cian, has 
to decide what should be his own answer. When his posiƟ ons have pracƟ cal implicaƟ ons, the ideal 
philosopher, like the Buddhist, lives his philosophy. But he, unlike the Buddhist, lives according to his 
personal opƟ ons among possible alternaƟ ves rather than ‘the only right way’ that he too has found.
Philosophical counseling is supposed to pracƟ ced by people that know philosophy, and believe 
that that knowledge may help people to live beƩ er, whether by improved coping with pracƟ cal 
and emoƟ onal problems and whether by an improved aƫ  tude to life, death, self, others, world 
and/or God. Actually, however, jobless graduates of philosophy that apparently have no idea how 
philosophical knowledge can be relevant to counseling want to learn from ‘the experts’ how to do 
‘philosophical counseling’. Moreover, there are also people that have no idea what philosophy is 
about who want to apply philosophical ‘techniques’ to their counseling pracƟ ce. The laƩ er should 
fi rst study philosophy.
The proposed workshop is meant for those that know philosophy. Here recalling is very 
meaningful, for it starts with the parƟ cipants’ personal experiences in which philosophical knowledge 
maƩ ered in the coping with pracƟ cal, existenƟ al, religious or moral issues. It conƟ nues with analyses 
and comparisons of the memorized cases and passes on to the quesƟ ons of its adaptability to other 
persons and its relevance in counseling. This leads to diff erent views about the nature and role of 
philosophical counseling, which cannot be called philosophical unless it enables the ‘counselee’ to 
choose reasonably his own opƟ on among various alternaƟ ves. Further workshops are necessary 
for the next stages: InformaƟ on about the applicaƟ on of philosophical ideas and methods in 
psychotherapy and religious healing is the basis of further analyses and comparisons. Learning 
about the approaches of experienced philosophical counselors should come only later, when the 
parƟ cipants already have an iniƟ al understanding of the domain and its diff erences from other 
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domains, and are able to discuss their relevance, applicability, goals and respect for the ‘counselee’s’ 
ability to judge and freedom of choice. Last but not least before personal experiences of counseling 
is a workshop in which the proper approach and aƫ  tude to the ‘counselee’, her cultural background, 
language and level of understanding, sensibiliƟ es, wishes, ‘sub-texts’ etc. is discussed. 
Although the workshop is designed for philosophers with no counseling experience the 
parƟ cipaƟ ons of the experienced ones will be highly appreciated.
Biography
Ora Gruengard studied philosophy and economics (BA, MA) at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem (Israel), conƟ nued with advanced philosophical studies at the universiƟ es of Lille and 
of Paris (France), and got the PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Years later, while I 
was teaching philosophy, I studied at Tel Aviv university general (BA) and cogniƟ ve psychology at 
the graduate level. I started my research on psychoanalysis in its cultural context during my stay in 
New York in the eighƟ es. With a growing interest in counseling and a diminishing faith in ‘clinical’ 
psychology, I studied family therapy at the Barkai InsƟ tute in Israel, but, despite my growing 
convicƟ on that the ‘arsenal’ of philosophical tools was much richer than those adapted by ‘clinical 
psychologists’, I sƟ ll believed that I had to comply with the formal demands from licensed ‘therapists’. 
I therefore parƟ cipated in pracƟ cal ‘clinical’ work at clinics within and outside mental hospitals in the 
framework of a program towards a ‘clinical degree’. Before starƟ ng my career of teaching philosophy 
I worked as a research economist in Israel and in France. I taught philosophy at several insƟ tutes, 
in Israel and abroad, mainly at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, and lately, 
at Shenkar College for Engineering and Design. I am pracƟ cing philosophical counseling since 1992.
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IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED HOW PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE CAN BECOME 
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT BOTH IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICALͳORIENTED ACTION 
RESEARCH AND CREATIVE AND INNOVATIVE UNIVERSITY PEDAGOGY
by
FinnThorbjørn Hansen
Professor i fi losofi sk og dialogisk praksis/ Professor in Philosophical and Dialogical Praxis
fi nnth@hum.aau.dk
A keyword and main guidepost in philosophical pracƟ ce and philosophical counselling is the 
Community of Wonder. Only when we reach this kind of community and open wondrous dialogues, 
it seems to me, are we truly in contact and dialogue with ‘that’, which calls upon us in our lives. To 
reach this ‘zone’ of dialogical wonderment requires a kind of ‘de-freezing of our ‘frozen’ concepts 
and asserƟ ons, as well as a silence and listening (Gelassenheit) that makes us able to hear the call 
of the phenomenon or subject maƩ er. But, and this is my main interest in this presentaƟ on, it 
also requires a kind of ‘acƟ on’, where we get out ‘in the open’ and put ourselves at play in a more 
existenƟ al and ontological way. WiƩ genstein refers to the Deed (and to Goethe) when saying that 
the most ‘original’ thing to start from is not the language game or even the given life form, but the 
acƟ on or beƩ er ‘re-acƟ on’ to ‘something’ (a calling) that demands our response. 
In this presentaƟ on I will discuss some of my ideas, approaches and experiences in using this 
kind of wonder- and acƟ on-based philosophical pracƟ ce as both a kind of acƟ on research method 
in human science (with designers and hospice staff ) and as a new, alternaƟ ve way of university 
pedagogy. My presentaƟ on will be based on a newly published book Can We Wonder Without 
Words. Design- and University Pedagogy in Higher EducaƟ on [500 pages, March 2014, yet only in 
Danish] and my coming book on Developing ExistenƟ al Dialogues on Hospices and in PalliaƟ ve Work 
through CommuniƟ es of Wonder. 
Biography
Finn Thorbjørn Hansen holds a PhD in Philosophy of EducaƟ on and is Professor in Philosophical 
and Dialogical PracƟ ce, Centre for Dialogue and OrganizaƟ on, University of Aalborg (Denmark). 
Hansen was the president of the Danish Society of Philosophical PracƟ ce from 2002–2010, and the 
organizer of the 7thICPP in 2004. He was the fi rst to have wriƩ en a PhD on the relaƟ onship between 
philosophical counselling and adult pedagogy in higher educaƟ on, and he has led training and master 
courses in philosophical counselling for over seven years now. Pofessor Hansen is the leader of the 
research unit Wonder Lab at Aalborg University, where he develops diff erent forms of wonder-based 
dialogue and educaƟ onal forms for higher educaƟ on and professional development. He is a prolifi c 
author on philosophical pracƟ ce. More at: hƩ p://personprofi l.aau.dk/123561?lang=en.
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PHILOSOPHICAL DIAGNOSIS: PRO AT CONTRA ͷ A DEBATE
by
Peter Harteloh
Yough E. Rhee
Detlef Staude
Lou Marinoff 
In several earlier ICPP’s, philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners have presented thoughts on the very 
idea of a philosophical diagnosis. These presentaƟ ons raised quesƟ ons and discussions that will 
be the focus of this workshop. The aim of this workshop is to discuss whether and to what extent 
philosophical counseling needs its own ‘philosophical diagnoses’ and ‘diagnosƟ c’ standards. On the 
one hand, it could be argued that in order for philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners to approach the clients’ 
problems in a professional way a certain diagnosƟ c tool or standard is necessary, because without 
such a tool no raƟ onal ‘treatment’, helping or dialogue, adjusted to the expectaƟ ons and needs of the 
client is possible. On the other hand, it could also be argued that any aƩ empt at such standardizaƟ on 
is contrary to the spirit of philosophy and its inherent sensiƟ vity to individuality and the uniqueness 
of every person’s issues, their worldview, values and parƟ cular sensibiliƟ es. 
Not only professionalism is at stake here, but also the appearance of philosophical pracƟ ce as 
a paradigm is involved. A framework for philosophical diagnoses could diff erenƟ ate philosophical 
pracƟ ce from psychotherapy or other health care disciplines. Such a framework would obviously 
diff er from the DSM, used in psychology and psychiatry, on which most philosophical counselors 
agree that it is the wrong standard for counseling and a conceptually insuffi  cient answer to most 
quesƟ ons about mental disorders. However, whether a framework for philosophical diagnoses is 
and can funcƟ on as an alternaƟ ve to the DSM, support its adversaries and open up possibiliƟ es is 
sƟ ll a topic of debate. 
Therefore, the workshop will address quesƟ ons about the nature, role and funcƟ on of 
philosophical diagnoses, such as: 
What is a philosophical diagnosis? Do we need philosophical diagnoses?
Do philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners (in some sense already) use diagnoses? 
To what extend do these diagnoses diff er from diagnoses used in other fi elds. e.g. psychotherapy?
What role can the philosophical diagnosis play in philosophical pracƟ ce?
What role can the philosophical diagnosis play in the professionalism of philosophical 
pracƟ Ɵ oners? 
Is a framework for philosophical diagnoses possible and desirable?
A forum of philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners will refl ect on these quesƟ ons by presenƟ ng their opinion 
in the form of theses. Dr Peter Harteloh and Dr Young E. Rhee will argue in favour of a ‘philosophical 
diagnosis’, while Detlef Staude and Lou Marinoff  will argue against such an approach. The workshop 
will present opportuniƟ es for the parƟ cipants in the conference to acƟ vely exchange views within a 
forum which would be the proper consƟ tuency for the establishment of any philosophical diagnosƟ c 
standard.
Biographies
The biographies of the parƟ cipants are given in their respecƟ ve presentaƟ ons, masterclasses 
and/or workshops elsewhere in this Book of Abstracts. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AS A NEW PARADIGM IN PHILOSOPHY
by
Peter Harteloh
Erasmus InsƟ tute for Philosophical PracƟ ce, RoƩ erdam
info@fi losofi scheprakƟ jk.com
In this paper, I will explain the deeper meaning of philosophical pracƟ ce by the ‘paradigm’ 
concept that was once used by T.S. Kuhn to explain the deeper meaning of science and scienƟ fi c 
knowledge. Philosophical pracƟ ce originated in the 20th century from a criƟ que of academic 
philosophy or psychotherapy. With social uƟ lity in mind, philosophers started consultaƟ ons aimed 
at individuals and SocraƟ c group meeƟ ngs. AŌ er a while, the social characterisƟ cs of a paradigm 
emerged, such as a theory (e.g. Hadot); recognized examples like Nelson, Achenbach, Marinoff  or 
Brenifi er; professional organisaƟ ons such as the IGPP; journals on philosophical pracƟ ce; meeƟ ngs 
(like this ICPP) and training programmes. Also, philosophical pracƟ ce provokes a fundamental 
discussion on the nature of philosophy and responds to a crisis in Western philosophy marked 
by deconstrucƟ vism and post-modernism, which are causing a detachment of meaning from the 
everyday life of the individual. Thus philosophical pracƟ ce shows the true characterisƟ cs of a 
paradigm. Philosophical pracƟ ce off ers examples of diff erent ways to put philosophy in pracƟ ce, to 
live logic, to live ethics, i.e. to become a philosopher. It serves a contemporary quest for meaning in 
society and is an impetus for the rejuvenaƟ on of philosophy.
Biography
Peter Harteloh studied medicine (graduaƟ on at Erasmus University as MD: 1987) and 
philosophy (MA at University Utrecht: 1996). He received addiƟ onal training in occupaƟ onal medicine, 
psychotherapy and philosophical counselling. He wrote a PhD thesis on quality management in 
which he explored the philosophical origins of the quality concept and its social applicaƟ on in quality 
management (2000). He used to work as a quality manager in health care organizaƟ ons and teach 
quality management and ethics at Erasmus University RoƩ erdam. Since 2007, he has worked as a 
philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner in RoƩ erdam, the Netherlands, with a focus on individual consultaƟ ons, 
SocraƟ c dialogue, courses on lifestyle management and philosophical walks. Since 2011, he has been 
a lecturer in philosophical counselling at the school for higher educaƟ on of Utrecht. His research is 
on dialogue, silence and the relaƟ onship between concepts and place (topology). He has conducted 
masterclasses on philosophical pracƟ ce in Italy (2008, 2010), France (2009, 2012), Japan (2008, 
2009, 2011, 2012, 2013), Thailand (2009, 2013), Tai Wan (2009), Cambodia (2012, 2013), Korea 
(2012), China (2013), Sweden (2013) and Greece/Athens (2013). He was the secretary (2007–2010) 
and president (2010–2012) of the Dutch AssociaƟ on for PhilosophicalPracƟ ce.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR DIAGNOSIS IN PHILOSOPHICAL CONSULTATIONS
by
Peter Harteloh
Erasmus InsƟ tute for Philosophical PracƟ ce, RoƩ erdam
info@fi losofi scheprakƟ jk.com
Most philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners work with a philosophical concept or idea as anchor point 
in the consultaƟ on process in order to make a consultaƟ on a real philosophical consultaƟ on. Some 
pracƟ Ɵ oners take a logical or epistemological stance and restrict the consultaƟ on to puzzle-solving; 
others take a more anthropological or phenomenological point of view and aim at self-knowledge or 
an enrichment of experience. OŌ en ethics is a frame of reference for problems on doing, idenƟ fying 
uƟ litarian or deontological tendencies and the standard problems these kinds of ethics carry. 
The philosophical concept or idea concerned can be called a diagnosis. From the Greek and 
LaƟ n origin, the word “diagnosis” implies (i) a descripƟ on of nature or cause, (ii) a disƟ ncƟ on (a 
classifi caƟ on), (iii) a lesson to be learned, (iv) a wriƩ en (explicit) statement, and (v) a public character. 
A philosophical diagnosis diff ers in content and varies much more than in medicine or psychology. 
Therefore, a framework for philosophical diagnoses could improve the communicaƟ on among 
philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners or between philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners and clients or third parƟ es. It 
could contribute to the professional development of philosophical pracƟ ce by educaƟ on or research. 
In this workshop I will fi rst introduce the idea of a philosophical diagnosis. Next, we will study 
an example (instrucƟ on video) of a philosophical consultaƟ on. ParƟ cipants are asked to come up 
with a philosophical diagnosis, i.e. a descripƟ on of the case in a philosophical sense. Finally, by 
analyzing the diagnoses made by the parƟ cipants, we will try to come up with a framework for 
philosophical diagnoses.
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THE EASTͳWEST PERSPECTIVE IN PHILOSOPHICAL CONSULTATIONS
by
Peter Harteloh
Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oner, Erasmus InsƟ tute for Philosophical PracƟ ce, 
RoƩ erdam, The Netherlands
info@fi losofi scheprakƟ jk.com
To those familiar with Asian philosophy (Indian, Chinese and Japanese systems of thought) and 
its principles staƟ ng that philosophy is a way of life and that philosophers are wise men who can and 
should help others to lead a good life in which knowledge and acƟ on cannot be separated, it might 
seem strange to hear that in the West there is a “new” kind of philosophy called “philosophical 
pracƟ ce”, a denominator for philosophers counselling persons in a private pracƟ ce, pracƟ cing 
something called “SocraƟ c group dialogue”, or discussing philosophy as a lifestyle. Philosophical 
consultaƟ ons, a one to one conversaƟ on of a philosopher with persons who do not necessarily have 
a philosophical training, on issues in (everyday) life, can be seen as a new way to philosophize in 
pracƟ ce. Since the 1980s, it is an alternaƟ ve to psychotherapy or academic philosophy. In the West, 
philosophical consultaƟ ons harbor many diff erent styles and philosophical tradiƟ ons (analyƟ cal, 
existenƟ al, phenomenological). In Asia, an Eastern point of view is involved in the consultaƟ ons, 
e.g. Hinduism (“Bhagavad Gita”), Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Zen, or the book of “I Ching”. I 
propose a workshop in order to study and compare diff erent styles of philosophical consultaƟ ons. 
ParƟ cipants will study an example of a philosophical consultaƟ on. They will be asked to interpret 
or comment on the case from an Eastern or Western point of view. We will compare points of view 
on similariƟ es and diff erences in order to draw some conclusions on an Eastern or Western way of 
doing a philosophical consultaƟ on. 
Chair: Peter Harteloh
Forum: Tetsuya Kono (Japan), Young Rhee (Korea), Tianqun Pan (China). 
Public parƟ cipaƟ on
Biography
Peter Harteloh is a philosopher. He studied medicine in RoƩ erdam and philosophy in Utrecht. 
He received addiƟ onal training in occupaƟ onal medicine, psychotherapy and philosophical 
consultaƟ ons. He wrote a PhD thesis on quality management in which he explored the philosophical 
origins of the quality concept and the social applicaƟ on of it in quality management (2000). Since 
2007, he works as a Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oner in RoƩ erdam, The Netherlands, with a focus on 
individual consultaƟ ons, SocraƟ c coaching and philosophical city walks.
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THE CHINESE ART OF ‘FEEDING ONE’S LIFE’ ΈYANGSHENG 養生Ή: 
THE POTENTIAL OF DAOISM FOR PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 
by
Dominique Hertzer 
Ludwig‒Maximilians‒UniversityMunich
dhertzer@zhouyi.de
The quesƟ on of how to “feed “ or to „nourish one’s life”  (yangsheng) is one starƟ ng point of 
Chinese philosophy searching for the good life. The Daoist tradiƟ on, as it is revealed in the classic 
work Zhuangzi 莊子, holds that to feed one’s life is the same as to feed one’s nature. So yangsheng 
is mainly concerned about learning to deploy, preserve and develop the capacity for live with which 
we are all endowed. But how we can use this idea in philosophical pracƟ ce?  
By having a deeper look at diff erent stories in the Zhuangzi, we will explore the various aspects 
of yangsheng in terms of the process of free communicaƟ on and unhindered exchange: the free 
communicaƟ on of men with his surrounding as well as the unhindered exchange between spirit and 
body. Especially the Zhuangzi shows, that while the body takes an individual shape, the spirit (shen 
神) acts on the individual and, at the same Ɵ me, has always reached beyond the individual. From a 
Daoist perspecƟ ve the spirit is rather a conƟ nuously fl owing process than a manifest state. We will 
explore this cosmic dimension of the individual by revealing the relaƟ on between “the way” (dao 
道)  and “virtuosity” (de德) – which is the process how the universal dao manifests as an intrinsic 
power (de) consƟ tuƟ ng a thing’s disƟ ncƟ ve being – as well as the deeper meaning of the pracƟ ce of 
„non-interfering“ (wuwei 無為),  in order to discover the Daoist art of feeding one’s life. 
Biography
Dominique Hertzer did her fi rst PhD in Sinology about the Mawangdui-Yijing  and was assistant 
Professor at the Ludwigs-Maximilians University in Munich from 1989 to 1996. AŌ er her study of 
TCM in Munich and Tianjin (China) she fi nished her second PhD in the fi eld of History of Medicine at 
the University of WiƩ en/Herdecke with the topic: Light of the Mind and PercepƟ on of the Soul - The 
Medical NoƟ on of the Psyche as an Expression of Philosophical Thought: China and the Occident. 
Besides working as an TCM therapist and a Philosophical counsellor Dominique Hertzer is conƟ nuing 
her research work in the fi eld of Chinese Philosophy and Medicine as well as on Daoism, with special 
regard to Philosophical PracƟ ce. She is teaching at the UniversiƟ es of Munich, Goeƫ  ngen and 
Oldenburg. 
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MASTERCLASS
30 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTITIONER
by
Will Heutz
IGPP Academy
willheutz@live.nl
The fi rst part of the masterclass will present an overview of the four-year sophocraƟ c leadership 
development that I iniƟ ally conducted with banking directors in Holland.
The second part will be an individual counseling session with a volunteer from the audience and 
with a meta-refl ecƟ on aŌ erwards. 
Biography
Since 1984 Will Heutz has been a pracƟ cing member of the German organizaƟ on for 
philosophical pracƟ ce. He was a board member of the IGPP. Today he is a mentor and teacher at the 
IGPP academy and a faculty member of  APPA.  Since 1987 he has been the elected chairman of the 
Filosofi sch InsƟ tuut voor Psychotherapy. I hold academic degrees in theology and philosophy, cum 
laude, and have specialized in psychopathology, summa cum laude, and in Jungian psychotherapy. 
Before starƟ ng his private pracƟ ce he worked as a ‘chef de Clinique’ in a philosophical AvanƟ /
psychiatric community in Belgium. A year ago he started a three-year educaƟ on programme with 
the aim of becoming a philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner (together with a colleague of mine, Dr Joep de 
Jong). He was born in 1954 and is a father of two beauƟ ful daughters, 26 and 23 years old.
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HOW SOCRATIC DIALOGUE ENCOURAGES PEOPLE TO TALK
by
Pia Houni
Adjunct Professor, Finnish InsƟ tute of OccupaƟ onal Health
pia.houni@uta.fi 
The aim of my presentaƟ on is to ask whether we need virtues today. Do we need to understand 
the idea of virtues in our everyday lives, in our work life and personal life? I will approach these 
quesƟ ons through the SocraƟ c Dialogue method (as a group conversaƟ on). I present two cases 
in which SocraƟ c dialogue worked with people who did not previously know each other. The fi rst 
example is a weekend course at a Monastery and the other is a long-standing group, which met ten 
Ɵ mes within one year. Both groups had between 13 and 20 members. In each group, one theme in the 
conversaƟ on was a virtue: either classical, such as courage (andreia); a Stoic virtue such as wisdom 
(sofi a); or a ChrisƟ an virtue, such as love (eros, fi lia, agape), etc. We also contemplated modern 
virtues: is there some virtue that modern humans need today? In this presentaƟ on I demonstrate, 
through the example of these groups, how the SocraƟ c method is constructed and how the theme of 
the conversaƟ ons developed together with the parƟ cipants. At the end of my presentaƟ on I return 
to my fi rst quesƟ ons and provide some ideas of how virtues might be important in today’s life (in 
personal and working life). I also use the SocraƟ c Dialogue method as a bridge to encourage people 
to talk and develop their self-knowledge, which we understand to be one purpose of philosophy. 
Biography
Pia Houni, PhD, is Adjunct Professor and Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oner. She has worked as Professor, 
director of Theatre Museum, Senior Lecturer, etc. At the moment she is a Specialized Researcher at 
the Finnish InsƟ tute of OccupaƟ onal Health. Houni is acƟ ve in the fi eld of philosophical pracƟ ce at 
CriƟ cal University and other places in Finland. She lectures, conducts SocraƟ c Dialogues, counsels 
and writes arƟ cles. At the moment she is fi nishing a fi rst book on philosophical pracƟ ce in Finland 
with PerƩ u Salovaara.
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WOMAN AS HEALER
by
Dena Hurst
Florida State University
dhurst@iog.fsu.edu
Women have long held roles as healers in their communiƟ es. Medicine women. Witches. 
AborƟ onists and midwives. Herbalists. Today, women make up the majority of care workers, from 
nurses to social workers to teachers to psychologists. While in contemporary western medicine, 
women largely perform support and administraƟ ve funcƟ ons, in tradiƟ onal and folk medicine 
women conƟ nue to play vital roles as diagnosƟ cians, pharmacists, and doctors. 
In the fi eld of tradiƟ onal psychology/psychotherapy, women dominate in terms of the number 
of pracƟ cing psychologists, at least in the western world. One reason for the so-called “feminizaƟ on” 
of mental health is the shiŌ  in culture. Various health insurance plans have made talk therapy a less 
lucraƟ ve profession, causing men to pursue the more lucraƟ ve fi eld of psychiatry. There is also an 
unspoken assumpƟ on that women prefer talk therapy and so have chosen to remain in that arena. 
This paper will quesƟ on both claims, parƟ cularly in light of the long history of women as successful 
healers of mind and body.
There is a long history of women working as pracƟ cing philosophers that parallels their 
work as healers. Women in many socieƟ es are the keepers of history, passing down the wisdom 
of generaƟ ons. Philosophical counseling holds the promise of reviving these roles for women and 
doing so in a way that empowers women. This paper will show how philosophical counseling allows 
women to embrace the archetypal Woman as Healer, as medicine woman, as priestess, as SocraƟ c 
midwife embodied.
Biography
Dena Hurst, Ph.D. is a researcher at Florida State University, where she has worked for the 
past 18 years. She also teaches philosophy courses, specifi cally applied philosophy courses, in the 
areas of feminism, philosophy of economics, poliƟ cal philosophy, philosophy of class, radical and 
revoluƟ onary philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of technology. She writes, consults, lectures, 
and provides individual coaching and guidance. She works primarily with government and non-
governmental organizaƟ ons to foster greater cooperaƟ on and collaboraƟ on at the grassroots, 
naƟ onal and internaƟ onal levels. Her passion is in working with groups that serve the oppressed, 
marginalized or vulnerable populaƟ ons. Dena has a cerƟ fi caƟ on in Philosophical Counseling and 
is associate editor for the American Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners AssociaƟ on journal, Philosophical 
PracƟ ce. Dena holds a bachelor’s degree in Economics from Stetson University (Florida) and a 
master’s degree and doctorate in Philosophy from Florida State University. She lives in Tallahassee, 
Florida with her daughter, three dogs and two cats.
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PAPER PRESENTATION 
PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS 
AFTER THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE ON MARCH 11TH 2011
by
Takako Ijiri 
Director of NPO “philosophical pracƟ ce ardacoda”
iiitakako@gmail.com
Tetsuya Kono 
Rikkyo University
VYQ05706@niŌ y.com
Since the Great East Japan Earthquake (March 11, 2011) and the Fukushima nuclear accident 
the Japanese people have tended to deeply refl ect on the direcƟ on of our civilizaƟ on and the true 
values of our life. This has led to a realizaƟ on of the importance of philosophical arguments on 
poliƟ cal issues, and an increased interest in philosophical pracƟ ce. Many people in Japan now wish 
to acƟ vely discuss the large and diffi  cult problems of the Japanese society, which have been caused 
or at least made obvious by the Earthquake and the Fukushima accident. Especially teenagers feel 
deep anxiety and oppression that are connected to these events and the corresponding social 
circumstances. This is why some students have started pracƟ cing and organizing philosophical 
dialogue by themselves. 
In our presentaƟ on we discuss three diff erent pracƟ ces of philosophical dialogue aŌ er 2012 
which are organized by students under 18 years and pracƟ ced outside the school. The fi rst one is 
“Relay-dialogue on 3/11 with teenagers” (conducted 2012-2013). The second one is “The Under 18 
Philosophy Café”, which has been operaƟ onal since 2012. The third one is a dialogue workshop in 
the briefi ng session of the TOMODACHI Project, held in 2013. These three cases allow us to refl ecton 
what philosophical dialogue can do for young people in the Ɵ me of diffi  culty in a general way.
Biographies
Ms. Takako IJIRI (M.A.) graduated from Waseda University (Department of the History of Arts), 
Graduate Schools of Osaka University (Clinical Philosophy). She is a director of non-profi t organizaƟ on 
“philosophical pracƟ ce ardacoda”, and a member of thephilosophy caféorganizaƟ on “café-philo”. 
Since 2006 she has held workshops, events of philosophical dialogue at cafés, community centers, 
and so on. Since 2013 she has been pracƟ cing philosophy for children at elementary schools.
Mr. Tetsuya KONO (PhD), Professor at Rikkyo University (Tokyo, Japan), Department of 
EducaƟ on, received his D.Lit. in Philosophy from Keio University. His research interests lie in 
philosophy, philosophy of educaƟ on, and ethics educaƟ on. His major publicaƟ ons include: (books, 
all in Japanese) IntroducƟ on to Philosophy with Children (2014), Consciousness Doesn’t Exist (2011), 
QuesƟ oning Morality: Liberalism and the Future of EducaƟ on (2011)
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PHILOSOPHICAL THERAPY AND THE INSANITY OF WAR
by
Ibanga B. Ikpe
University of Botswana, Gaborone
Ikpe@mopipi.ub.bw
The profession of arms someƟ mes exerts excruciaƟ ng mental stress on its members especially 
when such men are exposed to the extreme violence of warfare. The situaƟ on is someƟ mes made 
worse when the capacity of soldiers to absorb such stress is limited by personal circumstances or 
other condiƟ ons within their environment. In such cases, it is not uncommon for the stress of war 
to result in negaƟ ve behavioural changes and in extreme cases mental disorders. For the soldiers 
who live through such violence and others with an acƟ ve imaginaƟ on, the idea that they may end 
up bearing the physical and mental scars of war someƟ mes generates a level of stress of its own 
which may be as bad as the stress of war. Such stress does not only aff ect their capacity to perform 
their funcƟ ons as offi  cers and men but also aff ects their roles as spouses, parents and members of 
the community. This paper is about the psychological ravages of war on the men and women who 
acƟ vely parƟ cipate in it. It discusses the severe diffi  culƟ es that offi  cers and men go through and the 
connecƟ on that is usually made between such diffi  culƟ es and the behavioural and mental disorders 
that are someƟ me associated with exposure to the violence and war. While not pretending to have 
soluƟ ons to these problems, the paper argues that the stress that comes with the anƟ cipaƟ on of 
extreme violence can be greatly reduced through philosophical dialogue and therapy. Using as a 
blueprint, a philosophical therapy programme developed to combat stress in soldiers passing 
through staff  college programme, the paper demonstrates how philosophical therapy could help 
soldiers cope with the stress of being part of a recurring violence.
Biography
Dr. Ibanga B. Ikpe teaches Contemporary AnalyƟ c Philosophy and CriƟ cal Thinking at the 
University of Botswana and had previously taught at the UniversiƟ es of Lesotho, West Indies, 
Jamaica and Uyo, Nigeria. He also served as a CriƟ cal Thinking consultant to the Botswana Defence 
Command and Staff  College and sƟ ll teaches CriƟ cal Thinking to students of the college. He is a 
cerƟ fi ed philosophical counsellor and a chartered confl ict mediator. His philosophical pracƟ ce 
involves the use of CriƟ cal Thinking tools to achieve desired pracƟ cal outcomes in diverse seƫ  ngs.
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PAPER PRESENTATION 
ETHICAL AND COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
AS A FORM OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
by
Jones Irwin
St. Patrick’s College
Dublin City University
Jones.Irwin@spd.dcu.ie
In the Republic of Ireland, 96% of primary schools remain under church control and focus their 
religious and ethical curriculum on a form of religious ‘faith formaƟ on’ into a parƟ cular worldview e.g. 
Catholicism, ProtestanƟ sm, etc. Similarly, third level colleges of teacher educaƟ on have tradiƟ onally 
been denominaƟ onal. But in recent years, there has been signifi cant movement for change at both 
primary level and terƟ ary level with the introducƟ on of ethical and comparaƟ ve religious curricula. 
To date, this has only applied to so-called ‘mulƟ -denominaƟ onal’ primary schools, but there are now 
state recommendaƟ ons to introduce such ethical educaƟ on as mandatory in all schools and teacher 
colleges.
My own work, as a philosopher of educaƟ on, has been at the heart of this debate. Along with 
colleagues, I developed the fi rst undergraduate programme in the history of the state in ethical and 
comparaƟ ve religious educaƟ on, while also recently developing the fi rst postgraduate and Doctoral 
programmes in the same topic. My colleagues and I have also been working closely with schools to 
develop the new programmes on site.
These programmes are fundamentally informed by philosophical theories in the area of ethics, 
philosophy of religion and related sub-disciplines of philosophy. In this, they are genuinely, I would 
argue, forms of philosophical pracƟ ce. AddiƟ onally, as the conference remit suggests, such pracƟ cal 
educaƟ onal projects also have begun to have an impact on mainstream philosophy in Ireland and 
elsewhere. One such example is in the area of philosophy of educaƟ on, which is increasingly inter-
disciplinary and engaged in studies of pracƟ cal as well as theoreƟ cal nature. The seminal work of the 
Brazilian philosopher–educator Paulo Freire is especially instrucƟ ve and inspiraƟ onal in this regard.
My proposal for presentaƟ on is provisionally to lead a workshop based around these topics 
which would take account of the possibiliƟ es for Ethical EducaƟ on as a form of philosophical pracƟ ce, 
in Ireland and elsewhere. In recent years, I have also worked in Sweden, in the UK and in Germany 
with similar iniƟ aƟ ves. The workshop would take a two-pronged approach to the topic, exploring 
fi rst some of the pracƟ cal examples of such curricula, as well as their theoreƟ cal and philosophical 
provenance.  
The workshop idea is an initial suggestion as it is more discursive and dialogical in mode (suiting the 
topic and approach), but I would be more than willing to discuss other possibilities of presentation.
Biography
Jones Irwin is a Lecturer in Philosophy and EducaƟ on at St Patrick’s College, Dublin City 
University. He completed his PhD in Philosophy at University of Warwick, UK, in 1998. His recent work 
has focused on French philosophy (his monograph on Derrida and the WriƟ ng of the Body [Ashgate 
Surrey 2010]) and the problem of ethos in Irish schools. He has also been acƟ vely involved in the 
development of the new Ethics and EducaƟ on curriculum strand in St Patrick’s College, Drumcondra, 
which seeks to provide a mulƟ -denominaƟ onal opƟ on for teacher students. He was VisiƟ ng Fellow 
to Warwick EducaƟ on Department in 2013, working with Professor Leslie Francis on a project on 
‘Ethical and ComparaƟ ve Religious EducaƟ on – Tensions and PossibiliƟ es’. 
58
WORKSHOP
HERMENEUTICS WITH CHILDREN 
by
Miloš Jeremić
Požarevac Highschool, Požarevac
prof.milosh@gmail.com
‘HermeneuƟ cs with Children’ combines the development of thinking, reading, wriƟ ng and 
listening skills. It is mainly aimed at improving translaƟ on skills but is also good for pracƟ cing other 
varieƟ es of thinking skills. It is an introducƟ on into hermeneuƟ cs and the main objecƟ ve of this 
workshop is to improve the meta-cogniƟ ve dimension of translaƟ on and a variety of thinking 
skills. Of course, this workshop is designed to improve more varieƟ es of thinking skills. In the fi rst 
part, all parƟ cipants are siƫ  ng in a circle and have the task of wriƟ ng an argumentaƟ ve essay. All 
parƟ cipants are wriƟ ng their essays on paper. AŌ er that, all papers should be put in two paper bags 
– leŌ  and right – with each bag holding exactly one half of the essays. Then, parƟ cipants who had 
put their argumentaƟ ons in the leŌ  bag should take one interpretaƟ on from the right bag and vice 
versa. The next task is to read the text drawn from the bag and make a short interpretaƟ on of it 
without quotaƟ on. This interpretaƟ on should be meaning-preserving. When this is fi nished, the fi rst 
parƟ cipant reads his interpretaƟ on and the ‘secret’ author is called to recognize his argumentaƟ on. 
There are few possible results: few authors, one author and no author. But in all cases there is a 
chance to ask the author ‘is this what he wanted to say’ and whether the interpreter had made 
a ‘mistake’. The teacher then asks a quesƟ on aimed at fi nding why the interpretaƟ ons do or do 
not adequately restore the author’s intenƟ on. This is a chance to recognize many hermeneuƟ cal 
problems through inquiry and is also good for improving inquiry skills.
Biography
Miloš Jeremić is philosophy teacher in Požarevac Grammar School (Požarevačka gimnazija) 
since 1998. He graduated in philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad.  As a 
parƟ cipant of the 5th InternaƟ onal summer seminar on ‘Philosophical PracƟ ces’ in Burgundy he 
was trained by Oscar Brenifi er. He has been engaged in philosophical pracƟ ce since 2008. The main 
objecƟ ve of his pracƟ ce is teaching and couching students and training teachers. He is the author of 
few methodical arƟ cles published in UK, CroaƟ a and Serbia and of three educaƟ ve seminars based 
on the philosophical pracƟ ce for teachers cerƟ fi ed by the Serbian Ministry of EducaƟ on. His fi rst 
book, a syllabus for the subject Philosophy for secondary school will be published by March.
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CABARET PERFORMANCE
TO BE OR NOT TO BE: 
THE VIRTUE OF WIDSOM A ONEͳWOMAN CABARET PERFORMANCE
by
Barbara U. Jones
Psychotherapist and Philosophical Counselor
barbaraujones@gmail.com
Philosophical pracƟ ce refers not only to philosophical counseling but also to other applicaƟ ons 
of philosophical thought directed towards concrete situaƟ ons.  Cabaret, an inƟ mate, small scale yet 
ambiƟ ous revue which uƟ lizes songs, monologues, and humor as its mediums of communicaƟ on 
is intellectual and self-refl ecƟ ve and has oŌ en been used as a mirror of topical events including 
philosophy.  
This parƟ cular cabaret performance is a commentary on wisdom - the capacity to recognize 
the essenƟ als of what one encounters and to respond well and fi ƫ  ngly to them.   A wise person is 
one with a coherent, integrated set of aims, the strength of character necessary to pursue those 
aims, and the social bonds that give place and purpose to them. . Wisdom highlights the concept 
that excellence is more about the kind of person one is than the number of possessions or honors 
one accumulates. 
Audience members viewing “To Be or Not To Be” enrich and develop their worldview of wisdom 
through a logical, conceptual, existenƟ al, ethical, and aestheƟ c consideraƟ on of the topic.  Some of 
the structures, paƩ erns, and interconnecƟ ons that are implied when thinking about wisdom are 
delineated in order for audien ce members to analyze their own views about it.  In case this descripƟ on 
is beginning to sound too much like a lecture, it is important to note that all these concepts are being 
illustrated in large part through the use of songs by Mark Knopfl er, Randy Neuman, and the Beatles 
as well as other song writers.
Biography
Barbara U. Jones, Ph.D, has wriƩ en, produced and performed cabaret shows on the virtues of 
opƟ mism (“Accentuate the PosiƟ ve”), love (“You’ve GoƩ a Have Heart”), and wisdom (“To Be or Not 
To Be”).  In order to sƟ mulate further philosophical refl ecƟ on she has also developed and conducted 
workshops to accompany each performance.  Last year she performed one of her shows for the 
APPA in New York City as well as for the ICPP in Athens, Greece.  She has also wriƩ en an arƟ cle 
enƟ tled “The Art of Cabaret as Philosophical PracƟ ce” which was published in the APPA Journal.
Barbara has a Ph.D. in Transpersonal Psychology.  She studies acƟ ng, dancing, and singing in the 
service of performing.  Barbara is also a self-actualizaƟ on coach.  She writes a monthly newspaper 
column on parenƟ ng skills and produces a regular radio program on posiƟ ve psychology. 
 For more informaƟ on about Barbara: www.barbaraujones.com. 
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HEGEL ON THE THERAPEUTIC DIMENSIONS OF STATE AND PHILOSOPHY
by
Rastko Jovanov
InsƟ tute for Philosophy and Social Theory
University of Belgrade
rastko.jovanov@gmail.com
In addiƟ on to Axel Honneth’s thesis on the therapeuƟ c funcƟ on of the concept of ethical life 
(SiƩ lichkeit) in Hegel’s philosophy, I wish to give aƩ enƟ on to the two moments which, to my mind, 
show more clearly Hegel’s views on the therapeuƟ c dimension of both philosophy and the sovereign 
state against the ‘pathology of civil society’.
In this context, philosophy performs a correcƟ ve funcƟ on by fostering the individual’s virtue 
conceived as the ethical duty of care both for oneself and for others. The corrupƟ on of the individual 
which is possible within their ‘civil’ status is thus remedied by ethical work performed towards a self-
improvement, which is the domain of moral philosophy. One of the main problems for the moral 
development of individuals consists in their propensity to perceive the good in parƟ cularist and 
selfi sh terms: in this context events such as natural disasters or wars can be seen as performing a 
‘therapeuƟ c’ funcƟ on by teaching the individuals to view the good in more principled and general 
terms.
Biography
Rastko Jovanov received his PhD at the University of Vienna in 2011. He is the author of two 
books on Hegel’s philosophy (in Serbian and in German), and has also published various arƟ cles in 
peer-reviewed journals on Kant, Fichte, Heidegger, and C. SchmiƩ . In 2012 he spent his postdoc 
studies at the Hegel-Archive/Research Centre for Classic German Philosophy of Ruhr-University 
Bochum. Since 2011 he has been Research Associate at the InsƟ tute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
of the University of Belgrade. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE ͹ BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY OF HEALTH 
AND PERSONALIZED EDUCATION
by
Andrzej Kapusta
Department of Philosophy and Sociology
Marie Curie-Sklodowska University, Lublin
andrzej.kapusta@umcs.pl
Philosophical PracƟ ce (PP) shares some important assumpƟ ons with personalized educaƟ on 
programs (tutoring, mentoring) and holisƟ c moƟ vaƟ onal pracƟ ces (holisƟ c life coaching). PP is 
also defi ned against medical and psychotherapeuƟ c profession strategies (biomedical psychiatry, 
psychotherapy methods). The purpose of the presentaƟ on is to reconstruct the basic elements 
in PP (understanding, empathy, interpretaƟ on) and its theoreƟ cal assumpƟ ons (client autonomy, 
methodological specifi city, eff ecƟ veness). These elements and assumpƟ ons will be presented in 
the comparison to the contemporary mental health pracƟ ces and personal educaƟ on programs. 
PP will be generally defi ned as the contemporary expert movement against narrow technological 
experƟ se and against the triumph of technological reason (medicalisaƟ on, technical decision making 
matrices). The issues will be analyzed from the phenomenological, hermeneuƟ cal and neo-pragmaƟ c 
perspecƟ ve. The author will also discuss how such philosophical, cultural and organizaƟ onal contexts 
give us the possibility to introduce PP into philosophical study programs and will make philosophy 
teaching more aƩ racƟ ve. 
Biography
Andrzej Kapusta graduated in medicine from the Medical University in Lublin (1993), and 
received PhD in philosophy at Maria Curie Sklodowska University in Lublin (1999), He wrote his 
habilitaƟ on in cogniƟ ve science and social communicaƟ on at UMCS (2011). 
Kapusta is the author of the “Counselling and CommunicaƟ on in Business” program for 
philosophy students (BA) and the “Friendly University” project for mental health; he is also academic 
tutor at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology UMCS. 
Research interests: cogniƟ ve science and communicaƟ on, philosophy of psychiatry, 
neuroanthropology, philosophy of psychology, mindreading, decision-making theory.
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APPLICATION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY TO WORK WITH PARENTS 
OF CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
by
Katarina MarƟ nović
School for primary and secondary educaƟ on “Mara Mandic” Pančevo
catharinna33@yahoo.com;
Darko Kerekeš
The Ministry of EducaƟ on and Research of the Republic of Serbia
darkokerekes@yahoo.co.uk
In this paper we consider the possibility of applicaƟ on of ChrisƟ an philosophy to woringk with 
Ʃ he parents of children with developmental disabiliƟ es, through several pracƟ cal examples. This 
approach uƟ lises basic ethical postulates from the ChrisƟ an philosophy and is applicable to working 
with all persons, whether they are ChrisƟ an believers or not. 
The process starts as individual sessions with parents and develops through several disƟ nct 
phases. What makes the approach ‘ChrisƟ an’ in its general character is its emphasis on the concept 
of love as a value, rather than an emoƟ on. The process seeks to create an inclusive and commiƫ  ng 
set of aƫ  tudes in parents that arise from love perceivved not as a ‘feeling’ but as a mature aƫ  tude 
of acceptance, nurturing and care. This concept of love is one of ‘life iniƟ aƟ on’ with capacity to 
encourage the personal growth and maturing of both parents and children. Once the individual 
consultaƟ ons end the process conƟ nues as groupwork focusing on the consideraƟ on of values that 
might make up love and parents are encouraged to network and establish a lasƟ ng mutual support 
network. 
Biographies
Katarina MarƟ nović teaches Serbian language and literature to school children, and specialises 
in the work with children with special needs. She is a founding member of the Serbian AssociaƟ on 
of Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners and has special interests in behavioural counseling and philosophical 
consulƟ ng with the parents of children with disabiliƟ es, including those suff ering from mental 
illnesses or neurological defects.
Darko Kerekeš holds a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from the University of Belgrade, 
and a Master’s in Public AdministraƟ on (policy and governance) from Twente University, NL. He 
currently works as Project Coordinator at the Serbian Ministry of EducaƟ on and Science, within the 
Department for the Development of EducaƟ on and InternaƟ onal CooperaƟ on. His areas of experƟ se 
arethe development of educaƟ on and educaƟ onal inclusion. 
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AN EXERCISE IN PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE: 
A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF ON NATURALISTIC GROUNDS
by
Jordan Kiper
University of ConnecƟ cut
ordan.kiper@uconn.edu
The debate concerning the role of raƟ onality in natural theology has been characterized by 
a fundamental disagreement between two camps. The fi rst, known as reformed epistemologists, 
such as Alvin PlanƟ nga, hold that, because belief in God is “properly basic,” and many religious 
beliefs follow from this “reasonable” belief, religious beliefs are raƟ onal. The second, known as 
the WiƩ gensteinians, such as D.Z. Phillips, deny the possibility of fi nding reasonable evidence for 
the existence of God and are skepƟ cal of the role of raƟ onality in forming religious beliefs. For 
WiƩ gensteinians, unlike reformed epistemologists, religion is oŌ en important for the “good life” or 
“life worth living,” but is self-referenƟ al and logically cut off  from other aspects of reality. Despite the 
apparent divide between these two camps, the underlying tension between them is not uncommon 
for religious individuals in secular socieƟ es of the twenty-fi rst century, who struggle with their 
religiosity. With the purpose of counseling such persons, this paper suggests that there is a way to 
mount a parƟ al defense against the anxieƟ es produced by these posiƟ ons: philosophical pracƟ ce 
based on naturalisƟ c grounds. As will be seen, doing so requires a number of concessions that saƟ sfy 
reformed epistemologists of faith while simultaneously countenancing WiƩ gensteinian skepƟ cism. 
Furthermore, the paper draws from the latest discoveries in the cogniƟ ve science of religion and 
the evoluƟ on of religion to preserve those features of religion that are, in fact, natural and arguably 
raƟ onal; while at the same Ɵ me showing that religion is oŌ en benefi cial, despite failing to speak 
to every aspect of one’s reality. The outcome is one of philosophical pracƟ ce, which promises to 
benefi t religious adherents of tolerant sects by moving beyond blind faith or skepƟ cal fi deism, and 
saƟ sfying the conservaƟ ve need for raƟ onality while pacifying the liberal need to admit some degree 
of construcƟ vism.   
Biography
Jordan Kiper is a PhD candidate in anthropology and cogniƟ ve science at the University of 
ConnecƟ cut. He has a master’s degree in philosophy from Colorado State University, and undergraduate 
degrees in art history, anthropology, and philosophy. His research centers on the cogniƟ ve science 
and evoluƟ onary studies of religion, but draws heavily from debates in contemporary philosophy. 
By using the dialecƟ cal and logical methods of philosophy, along with advancements in naturalisƟ c 
accounts of religion, he hopes to contribute to emerging trends in philosophical pracƟ ce that seek 
to counsel raƟ onal and skepƟ cal, yet religiously oriented or sympatheƟ c, individuals in twenty-fi rst 
century society, who wish to countenance the values of science, secularism and democracy, without 
losing sight of the sacred. 
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by
Zoran Kojčić
CroaƟ an Society for Philosophical PracƟ ce, Dalj
zorankojcic@gmail.com
Work with students in the 21st century demands various approaches to new technologies. 
If we adjust our tasks to their daily habits, technology becomes student’s ally in teaching process. 
Students use mobile devices every day - to play, to listen, to write, to create. Combining these 
acƟ viƟ es with philosophical tasks brings us to a diff erent approach to learning. In this workshop 
parƟ cipants will engage in diff erent media, diff erent methods of creaƟ ve and criƟ cal thinking, and 
also in processes of conceptualizaƟ on and self-refl ecƟ on, all in interacƟ ve environment, working 
both individually and in groups, using their mobile devices which will be essenƟ al for parƟ cipants.
Mobile devices are usually seen as an enemy to teaching process. Lately, that sort of view is 
changing. Teachers all over the world are working on new ways of using mobile devices in classroom 
and the growing number of educaƟ onal applicaƟ ons on the market shows that this trend is giving 
posiƟ ve results. This workshop demonstrates how mobile devices can be useful in philosophical 
pracƟ ce both with children and adults, and how philosophical refl ecƟ on and reasonable quesƟ oning 
is needed and applicable for daily use of our gadgets.     
Biography
Zoran Kojčić (1986) holds MA degrees in Philosophy and CroaƟ an Philology from the University 
of Osijek, CroaƟ a. He is cerƟ fi ed Philosophical Counsellor by Portuguese Gabinete Project@. Zoran 
is Cofounder and President of the CroaƟ an Society for Philosophical PracƟ ce, and member of PeƟ t 
Philosophy AssociaƟ on, for which he parƟ cipated in several projects dealing with Philosophy with 
Children and organized Philosophy with Elders Program. Zoran teaches CroaƟ an Language and 
Ethnology at Dalj High School. He parƟ cipated in several internaƟ onal conferences and published 
papers on philosophy of educaƟ on and philosophical pracƟ ce. His main area of interest is 
Philosophical PracƟ ce, especially Philosophical Counselling and Philosophy with Elders. Zoran also 
publishes philosophical short stories and dialogues, and is the author of philosophical novel ‘Walk 
trough.’
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PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE FROM A STANDͳUP POINT OF VIEW
by
Roxana Kreimer
Center for Philosophical PracƟ ce and Research, Buenos Aires
roxkreimer@yahoo.com.ar
With a family resemblance of the stand-up style, we will criƟ cize some features of tradiƟ onal 
philosophy (among others, the principle of authority), as well as some procedures that are usual 
in Philosophical Counseling. We will share the results of experimental invesƟ gaƟ ons done by the 
speaker, that study the impact of authority fi gures in the value we aƩ ach to ideas (halo eff ect) and, 
in general, the infl uences of other distorƟ ons that limit our raƟ onality. What is the role of philosophy 
when experimental studies show that adherence to beliefs and decisions are less raƟ onal than is 
generally assumed? The SocraƟ c ideal aims to idenƟ fy and recognize our limitaƟ ons, and we will 
explore them in the common ground of humor and philosophy, which invite us to see things from 
an unusual point of view. We will also watch a video about the fi rst World ExhibiƟ on of Philosophy, 
created by Roxana Kreimer in her Philosophical Cafe of Buenos Aires. The video is not focused on 
the authority fi gure of philosophers but on ideas that can help us to live a meaningful life. We will 
suggest that similar exposiƟ ons can be created in other countries. 
Biography
Roxana Kreimer has a degree in Philosophy and a PhD in Social Sciences (University of 
Buenos Aires, ArgenƟ na). She works as a Philosophical Counselor since 2002, and has organized 
Philosophical Cafés on a weekly basis. Her book “Arts of good living” was the fi rst of Philosophical 
Counselling originaly wriƩ en in Spanish. She has also published in Spanish: “The History of Merit”, 
2000; “Love Fallacies”, 2004/2005, “The Tyranny of the Automobile”, 2006; “The Meaning of Life”, 
2008; “Inequality and Social Violence”, 2010, among other books and arƟ cles with other authors. 
She lectured and conducted Philosophical Cafes in several countries. She now works on quanƟ taƟ ve 
empirical research from a philosophical perspecƟ ve, and invesƟ gates philosophical issues from the 
perspecƟ ve of humor.
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HEGEL’S LOGIC OF TRANSFORMATION:
PERSONAL, INTERPERSONAL AND SOCIO–POLITICAL DYNAMICS
by
Jörn Kroll
San Francisco
San Francisco Municipal TransportaƟ on Agency
jornkroll@gmail.com
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is one of the most infl uenƟ al philosophers. His 
Science of Logic (WissenschaŌ  der Logik, 3 vols., 1812-1816) is an elaborate ontology that aims to 
refl ect not only the laws of proper thinking but also of natural, historical, and social evoluƟ on, and of 
the development of science, art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel’s evoluƟ onary philosophy portrays 
itself as the coherent reconstrucƟ on of the intertwined dynamics of being and becoming. 
Hegel’s entangled Logic indeed has surprising affi  niƟ es with the reciprocal interacƟ on 
of subatomic parƟ cles or waves. Erwin Schrödinger, Nobel laureate in physics (1933), called 
entanglement not “one but rather the characterisƟ c trait of quantum mechanics”. The counterpart 
to quantum entanglement in physics is conceptual refl ecƟ on in Hegel’s dialecƟ cal logic, which shows 
‘that each unit is essenƟ ally its refl ecƟ on in its opposite unit, its other, as well as the very creaƟ on of 
itself as the other’ (Science of Logic, vol. 2, my translaƟ on). 
The dynamic nature of Hegel’s self-propelling logical movements has aƩ racted thinkers and 
reformers who perceived Hegel’s Logic as a potent instrument of transformaƟ on due to its innate 
construcƟ ve negaƟ vity, embodied, for instance, in dissenƟ ng subjecƟ vity.
In my presentaƟ on, I outline applicaƟ ons of Hegel’s dialecƟ cal logic on three levels:
 the personal level (a mulƟ -faceted noƟ on of the self that not only allows but requires the 
challenges of transformaƟ on);
 the interpersonal level (seeing oneself in and as the ‘other’, leading to the creaƟ on of 
meaningful relaƟ ons); and 
 the level of group or social dynamics (confl ict, mediaƟ on, cooperaƟ on, organizaƟ onal 
development through eff ecƟ ve reciprocity with the environment).
Biography
Jörn Kroll studied various academic subjects in Europe and North America. He earned a PhD 
with a dissertaƟ on on applying various paths of MarƟ n Heidegger’s thinking to the improvement 
of street design (University of California, Berkeley; 2001). The American Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners 
AssociaƟ on cerƟ fi ed him in 2010 as one of its philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners (client counseling). Jörn 
is working as a TransportaƟ on Safety Specialist for a large San Francisco Bay Area transportaƟ on 
agency. He has frequently lectured on transportaƟ on and philosophical topics. Jörn is a student of 
Ancient Indian and East Asian philosophies (Vedanta; Daoism; Chan Buddhism; Zen), and explores 
the intersecƟ ons of philosophy, depth psychology, and cuƫ  ng-edge science. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE  ͵ QUO VADIS?
Ran Lahav
ranlahav@yahoo 
On this 20th anniversary of the First InternaƟ onal Conference on Philosophical Counseling, 
organized in 1994 by Lou Marinoff  and by me, it is appropriate to pause and assess the state of 
philosophical pracƟ ce and where it is going. What road have we travelled so far? What is the current 
state of our venture? And where should we go from here?
To examine these quesƟ ons, I will start by briefl y charƟ ng the history of our fi eld. I will then 
examine the above quesƟ ons from the perspecƟ ve of three main consideraƟ ons: First, the aspiraƟ ons 
of early philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners, including the German and Dutch pioneers of the 1980s. Second, 
the extent to which our fi eld is currently successful in terms of its outcomes and its impact on the 
general public. And third, the diff erent visions of philosophical pracƟ ce which exist today, and how 
likely they are to make a signifi cant contribuƟ on in today’s world. In discussing this, I will rely heavily 
on numerous interviewees which I have been conducƟ ng with acƟ ve pracƟ Ɵ oners throughout the 
world.
I will suggest that the exisƟ ng visions of philosophical pracƟ ce can be categorized into several 
main groups, and that this plurality is benefi cial for the health of the fi eld. However, I will also argue 
that relaƟ ve to the original aspiraƟ ons of earlier pracƟ Ɵ oners, philosophical pracƟ ce has undergone 
a process of normalizaƟ on, and at Ɵ mes even trivializaƟ on, and this trend has diminished the 
uniqueness of the fi eld and its potenƟ al appeal to the general public. I will conclude that the health 
and life of philosophical pracƟ ce depend today on our ability to make certain radical changes and to 
come up with novel visions of the philosopher’s role in the 21st century.
Biography
AŌ er receiving Ph.D. in philosophy and M.A. in Psychology in from the University of Michigan, 
USA, Ran Lahav taught and published in the fi eld of philosophy and psychology in the States and 
internaƟ onally. In 1994 he iniƟ ated the fi rst InternaƟ onal Conference on Philosophical Counseling, 
and co-organised it with Dr. Lou Marinoff , at the University of BriƟ sh Columbia in Canada.  
In 1995 Ran published the fi rst book in the English language in the fi eld (Essays on Philosophical 
Counseling), which was a collecƟ on of arƟ cles from leading pracƟ Ɵ oners at the Ɵ me. He is regularly 
invited to give workshops and lectures in various countries.
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THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
by
Anders Lindseth
Centre for PracƟ cal Knowledge, Nordland University in Bodø
School of Design and CraŌ s, Faculty of Fine, Applied and Per for ming Arts
Gothen burg University
Anders.Lindseth@hibo.no
The Beginning of Philosophical PracƟ ce
In this masterclass I will try to show how I start when someone comes to see me in my pracƟ ce. 
ParƟ cipants are free to present an issue they would like to talk to me about and clarify, although 
Ɵ me is limited of course. With this demonstraƟ on as starƟ ng point, I shall move on to the topic of 
methodology in Philosophical PracƟ ce, and I also wish to elucidate the philosophical concept of 
original beginning (arché). The concept of original beginning in Philosophical PracƟ ce is disputed; 
every narraƟ ve is part of an ongoing (re)construcƟ on of lived experience, many will maintain. 
Nevertheless, I fi nd it meaningful to talk about original beginning and important to realize such 
beginning in Philosophical PracƟ ce.
Short presentaƟ on of Anders Lindseth
Anders Lindseth (born 1946 in Bodø, northern Norway) is in Sweden Senior Professor for 
pracƟ cal know ledge at the School of Design and CraŌ s, Faculty of Fine, Applied and Per for ming Arts, 
Gothen burg University, – and in Norway Pro fessor Emeritus for pracƟ cal phi loso phy at the Centre 
for PracƟ cal Knowledge, Nordland University in Bodø. In 1989 he opened a Philo sophical PracƟ ce 
in Tromsø, 2002-2013 in Bodø, and since 2014 in Munich, Germany. He is vice president of the In-
ternaƟ onal Society for Philosophical PracƟ ce (ISPP)/InternaƟ onale Gesell schaŌ  für Philosophische 
Praxis (IGPP). Among many other Ɵ tles he has published:
Zur Sache der Philosophischen Praxis. Philosophieren in Gesprächen mit ratsuchen den 
Menschen. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2005. 
Being Ill as an Inevitable Life Topic – PossibiliƟ es of Philosophical PracƟ ce in Health Care and 
Psychotherapy, Philosophical PracƟ ce, 2012, 7, pp. 1081-96.
Anders Lindseth. I: J.B.L. Knox & J.K.B.O. Friis (eds.), Philosophical PracƟ ce 5 QuesƟ ons, pp. 
171-182. Copenhagen: AutomaƟ c Press / VIP, 2013.
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Tetsuya KONO
Rikkyo University
VYQ05706@niŌ y.com
Yohsuke TSUCHIYA
Ibaraki University
ytsuchiya@mcs.ibaraki.ac.jp
Mai MIYATA 
University of Tokyo
qq116223@iii.u-tokyo.ac.jp
In this presentaƟ on, I would like to consider the purpose and the method of evaluaƟ ng 
philosophical dialogue and the possibility of meta-dialogue as a means for self-evaluaƟ on. For 
conducƟ ng philosophical pracƟ ce as a profession, it is crucial to evaluate dialogue in the pracƟ ce. 
Especially, in classroom, it is an issue of accountability to show the development of students and 
to off er valuable guidance for their further development. However, there are many diffi  culƟ es for 
the evaluaƟ on of dialogue. One is the confl icts and the ambiguity regarding its purpose: why we 
evaluate dialogue. There are diff erent reasons for evaluaƟ ng dialogue in the classroom such as 
insƟ tuƟ onal, professional and pedagogical accountability, and there are inherent confl icts among 
these reasons as Laverty & Gregory (2007) have pointed out. We are ulƟ mately faced with the 
diffi  culty of determining the purpose of philosophizing. The second reason concerns the method 
of evaluaƟ on. There are already several credible methods to evaluate dialogue (Fisher 2008). They 
assess each student’s dialogic skills from the viewpoint of parƟ cipaƟ on, collaboraƟ on, enquiry, and 
criƟ cal/creaƟ ve thinking. However, a diffi  culty consists in how to evaluate which contribuƟ on made 
dialogue more philosophically deep. Another diffi  culty is to evaluate group dynamics of philosophical 
thinking. Group dynamics cannot be reduced to the contribuƟ on of an individual. How to evaluate 
a collecƟ ve aƫ  tude such as open-mindedness? We will also discuss the possibility of meta-dialogue 
for the self-evaluaƟ on of philosophizing and group dynamics.
Biographies 
Mr. Tetsuya KONO (PhD), Professor at Rikkyo University (Tokyo, Japan), Department of 
EducaƟ on, received his D.Lit. in Philosophy from Keio University. His research interests lie in 
philosophy, philosophy of educaƟ on, and ethics educaƟ on. His major publicaƟ ons include: (books, 
all in Japanese) IntroducƟ on to Philosophy with Children (2014), Consciousness Doesn’t Exist (2011), 
QuesƟ oning Morality: Liberalism and the Future of EducaƟ on (2011).
Mr. Yohsuke TSUCHIYA is a lecturer at the Ibaraki University in Ibaraki and Rikkyo University in 
Tokyo. He teaches philosophy, philosophy of educaƟ on, applied ethics and philosophy for children 
in these universiƟ es. He has also been a pracƟ Ɵ oner of philosophy for children at Kaichi secondary 
school in Saitama for 2 years. He and his colleagues translated MaƩ hew Lipman’s Thinking in 
EducaƟ on into Japanese.
Ms. Mai MIYATA is Ph.D. Student of Graduate School of Interdisciplinary InformaƟ on Studies at 
the University of Tokyo. She studies and publishes in the areas of Science CommunicaƟ on, CogniƟ ve 
Psychology and Philosophical PracƟ ce.
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The global 2008 fi nancial crisis showed us a new reality: the world is overindebted. Countries, 
companies and people are in an imbalance with their economies and fi nances. 
Even the strongest economies in the world, except China, have huge debts when compared 
with the wealth they generate. Large companies or corporaƟ ons are breaking up, being sold or 
joining with others.
When we analyzed the families and people, we noƟ ced a level of commitment to the payment 
of debts that threatens the families’ ability to purchase even the essenƟ al survival items if they are 
to honor their debt-payment obligaƟ ons.
Some sciences have been busy seeking to understand the reasons that had lead 
to overindebtedness, such as Economics (Behavioral Finance, Behavioral Economics and 
Neuroeconomics) and Psychology (Economic Psychology).
In Brazil, although the country’s debt is low (about 67% of Gross DomesƟ c Product), people 
are dangerously indebted. In Brasília, 81% of the families have some kind of debt which takes away 
from home spending up to 35% of their income.
In 2010, using Philosophical PracƟ ce as therapy support for indebted individuals and 
organizaƟ ons, I developed a comprehensive care project in personal fi nance. Due to the mulƟ ple 
faces and backgrounds of overindebtedness, the basic professional team for this type of philosophical 
pracƟ ce consists of experts from the fi elds of economics, fi nance, psychology, medicine and 
philosophy. The PEACE method was chosen as a foundaƟ on for the approach, and the results have 
been encouraging. The objecƟ ve of this master class is to present three cases dealt with through 
philosophical pracƟ ce within this project and thus illustrate the methodology and benefi ts of the 
approach.
Biography
José Eustáquio Moreira de Carvalho is an economist from the University of Brasilia (UnB), He 
has completed postgraduate studies in Finances Business AdministraƟ on at the Faculty of Economics 
and Business AdministraƟ on, University of São Paulo (FEA/USP). He is a member of the Brazilian 
InsƟ tute of Financial ExecuƟ ves in the Federal District of Brazil (IBEF/DF), Economic Advisor of the 
FederaƟ on Trade in Goods, Services and Tourism of the Federal District (Fecomércio-DF), General 
Business Manager at C&P Enterprises, ConsulƟ ng and Training, Inc., and President of the Center 
for Philosophical Studies of Brazil (CEFIBRA).  He is a cerƟ fi ed client counselor by the American 
Philosophical PracƟ Ɵ oners AssociaƟ on (APPA).
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Aljehinova 4, 11 000 Belgrade
gmedicsimic@gmail.com
Many fi nd the answer to the quesƟ on ’How do we know that a new age is coming?’ in the fact 
that the old ways of thinking cannot be applied to new challenges. Many authors will thus call the 
new age — the era of wisdom that is at its beginning. This era might bring us to the concept of man 
as a ’thinking acƟ vist’. Philosophical pracƟ ce has a great role to play to support this cultural shiŌ  and 
a shiŌ  in the self-percepƟ ons of philosophers. The paper discusses the tasks philosophical pracƟ ce 
faces within this shiŌ , such as the necessity to improve communicaƟ on skills in the process of raising 
social awareness and dexterity.
Biography
Gordana Medić–Simić has taught philosophy to grammar school students in Belgrade’s “MiluƟ n 
Milanković” high school since 2004. She holds an MPhil from the University of Belgrade (2002). She 
has also worked as a development trainer at the InternaƟ onal Business EducaƟ onal Cultural center 
since 2013. 
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ПРАВОВАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАК ПЕРСПЕКТИВА ФИЛОСОФСКОЙ ПРАКТИКИ
by
Игорь Невважай
кафедра философии
Саратовская государственная юридическая академия
igornevv@gmail.com
 Философская практика направлена либо на внешний мир, либо на внутренний мир чело-
века, поэтому представление о философской практике зависит от представления о человеке. 
В докладе я буду придерживаться тезиса, согласно которому человек есть нормативное 
существо, которое создает правила, изменяет их и следует им. Я предлагаю обсудить концеп-
цию правовой философии как теоретической основы философской практики. Правовая фи-
лософия рассматривает человеческое бытие в трех деонтических модальностях (разрешено, 
должно и запрещено). Прагматический аспект этой философии состоит в знании того, что для 
человека является невозможным, возможным и должным. В отличие от традиционной фило-
софии права, я предлагаю проект правовой философии, в которой право рассматривается как 
условие и пространство формирования человеческих качеств.
Одним из источников моей концепции является «философия поступка» русского фило-
софа Михаила Бахтина (1895-1975). В работе «К философии поступка» М. Бахтин использует 
понятие «неалиби в бытии». С помощью этого понятия я даю онтологическое обоснование 
представления о «внутренних» и нормах и человеческом долге.
Правовая философия осмысливает опыт рождения человека «правильного», то есть че-
ловека, следующего изобретенным им правилам. Такой подход связан с признанием ограни-
ченности того типа рациональности, который можно определить как рациональность de facto. 
Рациональность de facto основана на доверии разума некоторым фактичностям (Ж. Деррида), 
таким как тело, чувства. Иной тип рациональности основан на идее, что человека необходимо 
понять из безосновности его бытия (М. Хайдеггер), или как бытие свободы. 
Это возможно в рамках правовой философии, которая основана на рациональности de 
jure. Я доказываю, что различие между двумя типами рациональности заключается в разли-
чии конвенционального и фактического смыслов деонтических модальностей. 
Рациональность de jure изменяет смысл философского знания. Правовая философия 
предназначена для обоснования презумпций и фикций, на которые ориентируется коммуни-
кативная стратегия человеческого поведения.
Краткие биографические сведения:
Я родился в 1951. В 1993 г. защитил докторскую диссертацию в Институте философии 
Российской Академии Наук (Москва). Я являюсь профессором, доктором философских наук, 
заведующим кафедрой философии в Саратовской государственной юридической академии 
(Саратов, Россия). Я являюсь членом Международной Ассоциации по Философии Права и Со-
циальной Философии (IVR). Я опубликовал 5 монографий, и более 150 статей.
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mjoaoneves@yahoo.com
When we think or talk about our life we mainly have in mind our wake life. The eight hours 
most of us spend sleeping do not count. We only remember them aŌ er a bad sleep or when we had a 
surprising dream we conƟ nue thinking about during dayƟ me. Generally, people believe that the Ɵ me 
spent sleeping is wasted and therefore should be reduced to a minimum. Opposing these mainstream 
thoughts, María Zambrano states that sleep comes fi rst and awakening only aŌ er. This statement has 
been proved scienƟ fi cally correct. In a completely innovaƟ ve way, and in collision with Freud, Jung 
or Adler, who were all interested in dream contents, the phenomenology of dreams focuses on the 
form of the dream — its relaƟ on with Ɵ me percepƟ on — rather than the dream content. Inspired 
by María Zambrano`s Phenomenology of Dreams, my research has developed since 2004, involving 
students of clinical psychology, researchers in the Laboratory of Sleep Studies, Chronobiology and 
Telemedicine at the University of Lisbon Medical School, the Neurology Department at Faro Hospital, 
and private clients from my philosophical counseling pracƟ ce.
The applicaƟ on of the technique described in this presentaƟ on can produce signifi cant changes 
in peoples’ lives as I have tried to show in my book The RVP Method (Método RVP (Raciovitalismo-
PoéƟ co) – PráƟ ca Filosófi ca no QuoƟ diano, Lisboa: InsƟ tuto Piaget, 2009) where phenomenology 
of dreams is the most original aspect. This paper shows some examples of the Phenomenological 
Dream Analysis used as part of the RVP Method.
Biography
Maria João Neves is Associate Professor and integrated Researcher at CESEM — Center for the 
Study of Sociology and Musical AestheƟ cs of Universidade Nova de Lisboa, hƩ p://cesem.fcsh.unl.pt 
. She currently prepares post-doctoral work fi nanced by the FoundaƟ on for Science and Technology 
of Portugal (FCT, hƩ p://www.fct.pt/index.phtml.en. Maria has her philosophical pracƟ ce in Tavira 
(Algarve, Portugal), and has published a book on her methodology: RVP Method. Philosophical 
PracƟ ce in the Everyday Life, Lisbon, 2009.
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The proneness to philosophize is a capacity we may recognize in ourselves and others already 
as early teenagers. It also seems clear that this ability is not created by reading philosophy. The need 
to philosophize is rather what moƟ vates our interest for the works of philosophers.
But what in essence lies behind the acƟ vity we call philosophizing? Some of its crucial features 
would appear to be freedom, originality, creaƟ veness and closeness to life. Furthermore, dialogue, 
rather than solitary thinking, seems to be its most natural form. Finally, philosophizing is an acƟ vity 
we engage in for its own sake. 
It seems that in tradiƟ onal university studies of philosophy there is not much place leŌ  for 
philosophizing as such. Philosophical pracƟ ce, with its ambiƟ on to bring philosophy back to its SocraƟ c 
roots by recreaƟ ng the arts of philosophical quesƟ oning and philosophical dialogue, may seem more 
promising in this respect. However, unlike what appears to be the case with the convenƟ onal acƟ vity 
of philosophizing, philosophical pracƟ ce is oŌ en understood as an instrumental acƟ vity, done for 
the purpose of discovering general principles or the disclosure of presupposiƟ ons of thinking. SƟ ll, 
philosophizing may be seen to be at the core of some well-known methods of philosophical pracƟ ce, 
such as neo-SocraƟ c dialogue.  
The aim of the proposed presentaƟ on is two-fold. (1) To draw an outline of what the acƟ vity 
we call philosophizing is, and (2) to give an indicaƟ on of how neo-SocraƟ c dialogue may be used for 
(genuine) philosophizing by examining its rules and drawing from experience.
Biography
Bernt Österman received his PhD from the University of Helsinki in 1995, where he  has been 
teaching philosophy since the late 1980’s. Bernt is currently the Curator of the von Wright and 
WiƩ genstein Archives at the University of Helsinki (hƩ p://www.helsinki.fi /wwa/).  His main research 
interests are value theory and the philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright, but he has also published 
papers on the philosophy of music. His interest in Philosophical pracƟ ce started from parƟ cipaƟ ng in 
the acƟ viƟ es of the Finnish Philosophical AssociaƟ on Interbaas, which he is also currently chairing. 
Interbaas, among other things, arranges public philosophical discussions in Helsinki. It was also in 
the context of Interbaas that he fi rst got familiar with the method of neo-SocraƟ c dialogue. Together 
with some other members of Interbaas, he iscurrently undergoing a facilitator-training led by Helge 
Svare of NSFP (which will end in 2014). 
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There are two basic ways to build a relaƟ onship with reality: to understand it as it is or to 
reinvent it in our understanding. Since the fi rst path is diffi  cult, people oŌ en use the second one. 
For example, markeƟ ng presents the reality in ways that oŌ en lead to disappointment and false 
percepƟ on. There is a third way: to use the experience of mankind in solving typical, frequently 
recurring problems. 
The third path is that of philosophical discourse. This presentaƟ on will discuss the divergent 
perspecƟ ves of philosophical cogniƟ on and interpretaƟ on on the one hand, and those of manipulaƟ ve 
markeƟ ng, on the other, and show how philosophical pracƟ ce can help confront the predominant 
models of markeƟ ng of illusions in an increasingly consumerist world.
Biography
Leonid Dzhorzhovic Petryakov is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Yaroslavl State 
University. He is the author of two books: The problem of diff erences and contradicƟ ons. Language 
as a means of objecƟ fi caƟ on of raƟ onality (Yaroslavl, 2009), and Discourse as a method of human 
knowledge (Moscow, 2013).
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BUT IS IT PHILOSOPHY? 
CAFE PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL COORDINATION OF INQUIRY  
by
Michael Picard
Simon Fraser University, Douglas College
mpicard@telus.net
Public parƟ cipatory dialogue exists in numerous forms in various communiƟ es worldwide. It 
may be asked under what condiƟ ons such mob inquiry consƟ tutes philosophy. The least disputable 
criterion of philosophy requires the presence of transparent argumentaƟ on. It may be quesƟ oned 
whether all peer-reviewed professionally-published philosophy meets this criterion, let alone 
loosely-moderated public chinwags. It becomes imperaƟ ve to determine whether the publically 
acceptable ever coincides with the logically normaƟ ve. Besides norms of reason, pragmaƟ c norms, 
though not wholly explicit, are also in eff ect, as determined by the social goal of public parƟ cipatory 
philosophy and/or the facilitator. It is argued here that the two sets of norms indeed coincide, 
under certain methodological assumpƟ ons regarding dialogue facilitaƟ on. Those presumpƟ ons are 
unearthed, explored and put to the test in the present arƟ cle, which argues that philosophy can 
exist, but must not be presumed to exist, in public venues for parƟ cipatory dialogue, unƟ l certain 
social precondiƟ ons (dialogic norms) are interpreted and collecƟ vely enforced. The conclusion is 
that philosophy is not inherently a private occupaƟ on (although it is derivaƟ vely); it is intrinsically 
public and social.  The only possible basis of philosophical therapeuƟ cs is mooted. 
Biography
Michael Picard is a philosopher, internaƟ onal author and public intellectual. He holds an MSc 
and PhD in philosophy from MIT, and has off ered private philosophical therapeuƟ cs based on social 
(or use-based) theories of meaning. As a philosopher he seeks to release the fl y from the fl y-boƩ le. 
He is the author of Philosophy: Adventures in the Thought and Reasoning (previously enƟ tled This is 
not a Book) and also co-authored Paradoxes, From Illusions to Infi nity: Adventures in the Impossible. 
He teaches philosophy and cogniƟ ve science at Canadian colleges and universiƟ es, having also taught 
university courses in psychology, management, leadership, economics and sustainability. He has 
facilitated over 600 session of pubic parƟ cipatory philosophy, despite having failed to understand 
what that is or might be.
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gerardoprim@yahoo.com.ar
Philosophers (including philosophical counsellors) and psychologists (including 
psychotherapists) have much to gain by increasing their mutual dialogue: psychology can contribute 
with the systemaƟ c tesƟ ng of empirical claims that are relevant for philosophical pracƟ ces, while 
philosophy can contribute with the criƟ cal analysis of concepts, assumpƟ ons and arguments that 
are relevant for psychological pracƟ ces. Nevertheless, some misconcepƟ ons on both sides have 
occasionally prevented a more fruiƞ ul dialogue. This paper will analyze some examples of those 
misconcepƟ ons, and will off er some thoughts and proposals oriented to improve the dialogue 
between these disciplines.
Biography
Gerardo Primero has a degree in Psychology (UBA, University of Buenos Aires, 1995) and is 
currently doing a PhD on Epistemology and History of Science (UNTREF, NaƟ onal University of Tres 
de Febrero). He is working as a philosophical counsellor, has coordinated Philo-Cafes in Buenos Aires, 
and has also off ered courses about philosophy and psychology (in Madrid, Seville and Buenos Aires). 
He is parƟ cipaƟ ng in research projects regarding philosophy of science (supported by the NaƟ onal 
Agency of ScienƟ fi c and Technological PromoƟ on), and conceptual skills (supported by the Secretary 
of Science and Technology of the University of Buenos Aires). Among other topics, he has published 
arƟ cles about philosophical pracƟ ce, psychological treatments, and conceptual skills.
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AnalyƟ cal Philosophy has backed up philosophical pracƟ ce since its birth. This is due to its 
associaƟ on with criƟ cal thinking and pragmaƟ sm. This modality of Philosophical PracƟ ce has been 
useful because it has helped create various problem-solving methods; however, in the 20th and 21th 
centuries it became increasingly clear that other types of reasons for acƟ ons were equally relevant 
for philosophical pracƟ ce. These include symbolic, mysƟ cal or poeƟ c reasons, among others. In 
this paper I rely primarily on the conƟ nental tradiƟ on in arguing for experienƟ al grounds as the 
foundaƟ on of philosophical pracƟ ce. This observaƟ on has led me to consider the establishment of 
philosophical pracƟ ce based on what we shall call ‘experienƟ al reason’.
ExperienƟ al reason is a kind of reason born aŌ er the person or a group of persons have lived 
crucial life experiences. For an individual, they may include giving birth, the death of a closer relaƟ ve, 
or recovery from a major illness. Such experiences generate a parƟ cular type of knowledge, which 
someƟ mes leads people to believing that they have learned the ‘essence of the miracle of life’ or the 
‘mystery of our fi nitude’. Such ‘knowledge involves cogniƟ vely relevant informaƟ on from the outside 
world or from ourselves, however it also opens up a sort of lively awareness inside the agent. In a 
sense, one becomes a ‘new person’aŌ er living these experiences.  
This paper discusses (1) how analyƟ c philosophy may serve as a foundaƟ on for philosophical 
pracƟ ce, (2) the limitaƟ ons of such approach to philosophical pracƟ ce, (3) potenƟ al ways to go 
beyond these limitaƟ ons that are off ered by ‘experienƟ al philosophy’, and (4) connecƟ ons between 
this theory and Philosophical PracƟ ce.
Biography
José Barrientos-Rastrojo is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Seville (Spain). He is the 
Editor of the InternaƟ onal Journal of Philosophical PracƟ ce HASER, the author of books, over 100 
arƟ cles and contributor to over 100 philosophical conferences.  a hundred conferences.
Barrientos-Rastrojo organized the 8th ICPP, as well as numerous other events focusing on 
philosophical pracƟ ce both in Spain and abroad.
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by
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This paper aims to report the acƟ viƟ es within the area of philosophical pracƟ ce in Spain. It 
focuses on the work iniƟ ated at the University of Seville. There, we have designed a model based 
on three pillars: pracƟ ce, research and teaching. All collaborate to a unique target: to raise rigorous 
philosophical pracƟ ce. 
In 2006 an offi  cial research group was created at the University of Seville, where we have been 
studying diff erent aspect of philosophical pracƟ ce by means of acƟ on-research projects. The work 
has focused on real pracƟ ces that we had set up in diff erent contexts (prisons, health care, business, 
teaching and consultaƟ ons). The “Filosoİ a Aplicada” research group has published more than 30 
books over the last six years; it has also edited the peer-reviewed journal HASER (InternaƟ onal Journal 
on Philosophical PracƟ ce).1 In addiƟ on, Filosoİ a Aplicada has organised 6 internaƟ onal research 
seminars on philosophical pracƟ ce and the 8th InternaƟ onal Conference on Philosophical PracƟ ce. 
Its members have supervised 3 PhDs on philosophical pracƟ ce and are in the process of supervising 
another 3. All this acƟ viƟ es have paved the way to formal university teaching and lectures: an MA in 
Philosophical PracƟ ce, secƟ ons or themes on philosophical pracƟ ce within the various compulsory 
subjects at the University of Seville, opƟ onal university courses and the introducƟ on of an offi  cial 
subject on Philosophy for Children and Philosophical PracƟ ce. 
PRT (PracƟ ce-Research-Training) is the base of the newborn Iberoamerican Research Network 
on Philosophical PracƟ ce. This insƟ tuƟ on includes over 50 academics from almost every country 
in Iberoamerica. It is therefore an umbrella insƟ tuƟ on for the pracƟ cing, researching and teaching 
philosophical pracƟ ce in the region.  
1  Download at http://issuu.com/jbbr(last accessed 28 December 2013).
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Does philosophical pracƟ ce need diagnosis? How about philosophical counseling or 
philosophical therapy? I shall suggest that we philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners need some type of diagnosi 
in so far as philosophical pracƟ ce is a profession for us and for the people who visit us. Philosophical 
pracƟ ce is, and must be, a professional acƟ vity from the beginning. We have been told from the 
inside of the philosophical community that philosophical pracƟ ce is diff erent from psychological 
counseling or medical therapy. This idea is one of the slogans to express the idenƟ ty of philosophical 
pracƟ ce. How, then, can we secure this idenƟ ty? SocraƟ c dialogue as a method may well be the most 
promising candidate tool to mark philosophical pracƟ ce a professionally recognizable discipline, 
however SocraƟ c dialogue alone does not secure the professional idenƟ ty of philosophical pracƟ ce. 
We want something more when pracƟ cing philosophy to people in existenƟ al problems and diseases 
of the soul. Philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oners are doctors for the existenƟ al problems and the diseases of 
the soul. Just as medical doctors and psychotherapists have the DSM, we need a counterpart of the 
DSM which would be formulated in a philosophical and humanisƟ c spirit. Then, what’s that? In this 
paper I examine the pre-diagnosƟ c system of the HumaniƟ es Therapy Project in Korea. The system 
uses the HumaniƟ es Index (HI) — an integrated index, which combines already developed indexes 
for checking various elements of mental well-being such as self-esteem, sympathy, worldview and 
value.
Biography
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He is currently a professor at Kangwon NaƟ onal University, Korea. Dr Rhee has interests in explaining 
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Dr Rhee is Vice-President of the Korean Society of Philosophical PracƟ ce. He is also editor of 
the Journal of HumaniƟ es Therapy and Editor-in-Chief of the Korean Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science.
His recent publicaƟ ons include Explaining the Mind(2010), HumaniƟ es Therapy: Theory 
and Principles(2011), Case Studies of HumaniƟ es Therapy (2013), “A More Philosophical Model 
of Counseling” (2010), ‘IdenƟ ty of HumaniƟ es Therapy’(2011), ‘Issues in the Extended Mind 
Theory’(2012), ‘On the Metaphysics of Logic-based Therapy’ (2012), and ‘IdenƟ ty and Tasks of 
Philosophical Therapy’ (2013).
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Philosophical pracƟ ce and high school philosophical educaƟ on share a common eff ort: to 
make philosophy fruiƞ ul and meaningful for people who would not likely be engaged professionally 
in philosophy. Following Dewey, we can summarily say that in both cases philosophy is seen as 
something that concerns all human beings – not primarily professional philosophers. 
Moreover, teaching at school (ideally) has a dialogical form; it requires from the teacher the 
ability to establish a profound human relaƟ onships and to communicate with human beings who 
usually have very diff erent worldviews (both from each other and, oŌ en, from the teacher as well). 
Finally, teaching provides the opportunity of pracƟ cing philosophy regularly with the same class, this 
situaƟ on possibly echoes the spirit of the ancient Greek pracƟ ce of philosophy in closed communiƟ es.
However, regardless of of these and other similariƟ es and connecƟ ons between Philosophical 
PracƟ ce and the high school philosophical educaƟ on of young adults (which is quite a diff erent 
maƩ er from the already established Philosophy for Children), the quesƟ on of how Philosophical 
PracƟ ce may change and improve the pracƟ ce of teaching philosophy in the high school has – unƟ l 
recently – been quite neglected (with some excepƟ ons in Italy).
In my contribuƟ on I would like to shed some light on this issue and to present and discuss 
some ‘philosophical exercises’ as philosophical pracƟ ces which may take place in the classroom.
Biography
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course (including a pracƟ cal training) and became a Philosophy and History teacher in a secondary 
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Irvin Yalom´s Und Nietzsche Weinte, as well as The Spinoza-Problem are read extensively 
among those interested in philosophy, mainly outside the academia, but also by people linked with 
it, primarily in Switzerland and Germany. In the workshop I combine the topics of “What do clients 
expect from philosophers?”, and “(Not) pleased to meet you, Schopenhauer”. I expect that some of 
the parƟ cipants have read Yalom´s book, so that we can discuss the co-operaƟ on of Philip, becoming 
a philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner, with his professional partner Tony, concentraƟ ng on psycho-social 
counseling. In doing so, we will also try to give an account of our point of departure, Yalom´s text.
Biography
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In my philosophical work with people, ‘worldview analysis’ is an important aspect of my 
procedure. In my opinion, the most impressive aspect of the life-philosophies of lay philosophers is 
their way of dealing with metaphysical quesƟ ons. Many of the people with whom I worked developed 
very personal concepts of and approaches to transcendence, thus providing a deep and far reaching 
source of meaning-consƟ tuƟ on for their life.
This is even more impressive, since many (if not most) academic philosophers hold a naturalisƟ c 
worldview. This is quite oŌ en accompanied by an almost complete lack of a deeper understanding 
of transcendence. People aƩ ending my seminars or those who come as clients for counseling are 
usually engaged in a lifelong quest for meaning, and many of them are deeply engaged in processes 
which may be described as ‘transcending towards transcendence’. Without any kind of personal 
approach to transcendence, or at least an open aƫ  tude towards it, we would not be able to 
effi  ciently deal with such people. More than 2/3of people in countries that belong to our Western 
culture have some kind of connectedness to a transcendent dimension; this means that we can only 
help a minority of people if a naturalisƟ c worldview is strictly followed.
I will present examples of such ‘metaphysical approaches’ of lay philosophers and will also 
provide some demonstraƟ ons of the ‘maieuƟ c hermeneuƟ cal approach’ I am using in seminars (or 
similar in counseling sessions). This quite oŌ en helps people to create new perspecƟ ves for their 
personal life, bringing up or fostering new sources of meaning. 
Biography 
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Everyone has their own manner of understanding and pracƟ cing what we call Philosophical 
PracƟ ce. This is evident, but oŌ en enough we don’t have a precise idea in what way we work and 
where the diff erences lie in regard to other pracƟ Ɵ oners. The person of the pracƟ Ɵ oner itself might 
establish such a diff erence, but there are also certain elements which in themselves consƟ tute a 
type of pracƟ ce .While they fi nd these cornerstones of their own peculiar pracƟ ce the parƟ cipants 
of this masterclass work on the concept of their peculiar way of Philosophical PracƟ ce. By doing 
this we become conscious of what we do, what we want to do and which quesƟ ons sƟ ll remain 
open. Hereby our pracƟ ce wins more coherence. Moreover, it becomes easier to explain to other 
pracƟ Ɵ oners, what is important for us in Philosophical PracƟ ce and why, and to understand their 
diff erent points of view.
Biography
Detlef Staude is philosophical pracƟ Ɵ oner since 1997 in Berne (Switzerland) www.philocom.ch; 
president of the Swiss network of pracƟ cal philosophizing philopraxis.ch; publisher of three books 
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This presentaƟ on focuses on the conceptualizaƟ on of desire according to which desire can only 
be realized if its object is fully aƩ ained. However, although it can manifest itself as anactual need, 
desire also aims for another, usually unconscious, goal. Understood in this Lacanian way, desire can 
never be fully saƟ sfi ed because it relates to a fundamental lack that goes beyond concrete needs. 
But what is desire then exactly targeƟ ng? What is at stake when we have a desire? From which 
kind of lack does our lifelong and unrealizable desire originates from? The following sentence from 
Lacan may be instrucƟ ve: ‘Desire is neither the appeƟ te for saƟ sfacƟ on nor the demand for love, but 
the diff erence that results from the subtracƟ on of the fi rst from the second.’ Philosophical refl ecƟ on 
can help us to beƩ er understand and validate this psychoanalyƟ c proposiƟ on in order to avoid 
conceptual confusionregarding such complex terms as: desire, need, wish etc. Philosophical pracƟ ce 
can be a useful tool for those persons who are searching for the truth of their desire. Philosophical 
dialogue can also help to uncover this truth, although we may never arƟ culate it in appropriate 
terms.
Biography 
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The training program for secondary school teachers off ers the trainees the possibility to build 
a personal and professional project so they could tackle the complexity of every-day teaching and 
learning situaƟ ons. This project is mainly organised around a catalogue of competences that have to 
be developed, pracƟ ced, quesƟ oned and evaluated during the inducƟ on phase. The alternaƟ on of 
training moments between the fi eld work (i.e. the pracƟ ce of teaching) and the university (i.e. the 
teacher’s training as a theoreƟ cal background for teaching) contribute to a personal professional 
experience, thus enabling the future teacher to conceptualize his pracƟ ce theoreƟ cally and explore 
these models in the fi eld work. The method at hand is a personal porƞ olio which the future teacher 
must construct relying on the founding principles of the training program: competences, the auto-
refl ecƟ on onhis exchange about teaching pracƟ ce with his peers – senior teachers and trainers of 
the learning community.  
In order to iniƟ ate these competences one of the eight transversal courses hosted at the 
Université du Luxembourg make specifi c use of philosophical pracƟ ce in terms of SocraƟ c dialogue. 
This course deals with the analyses of teacher’s pracƟ ce provided by peer groups. Every teacher 
trainee has to present at least one professional situaƟ on which he idenƟ fi es as being a criƟ cal 
professional incident. These situaƟ ons are then analyzedusing SocraƟ c dialogue (adapted to the 
specifi c needs of the training program). 
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From its origin, analyƟ c philosophy has in an important sense been therapeuƟ c. Its role was 
iniƟ ally correcƟ ve in relaƟ on to tradiƟ onal philosophy at the Ɵ me, based on the idea that tradiƟ onal 
philosophy oŌ en made errors of logic, syntax and meaning in aƩ empƟ ng to express ideas. This is 
well in line with WiƩ genstein’s statement that philosophy is not a theory, butan acƟ vity that clarifi es 
thought.
The role of philosophical pracƟ ce in relaƟ on to general philosophy is similar, in the sense that 
it points to cleavages between theoreƟ cal philosophy’s ambiƟ ons to grasp aspects of the reality and 
its seeming inability to saƟ sfy the human need to use philosophical insight to address that reality 
and correct aspects of it that make the human life troublesome, stressful or dysfuncƟ onal on various 
levels.
The philosophical pracƟ ce that uƟ lices analyƟ c philosophy in parƟ cular is a potent tool, oŌ en in 
the form of SocraƟ c dialogue, to assist interlocutors to clarify their ideas, values, views and aƫ  tudes. 
This is what disƟ nguishes philosophical pracƟ ce most clearly from psychology and psychotherapy. At 
the same Ɵ me, this is a feature of philosophical pracƟ ce that shows its inherent conƟ nuity of goals 
and methods with theoreƟ cal philosophy.
Biographies
Tian-QunPan: Professor of Department of Philosophy, Nanjing University, China. Researh 
Fileds: Logic, Game theory, Philosophical pracƟ ce.
Chun-Gui Yang: Professor of School of Economics and Managment, Nanjing University of 
InformaƟ on of Science and Technology, China. Research fi elds: Human resources.
88
PAPER PRESENTATION
POLYMORPHOUS RATIONALITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE:
PHILOSOPHIZING AS WORKING ON AND WITH POLYMORPHOUS RATIONALITIES
by 
Minke Tromp
Bureau for Applied Philosophy
minke.tromp@bvƞ .nl
The arƟ cle presents aims to de-fi xate raƟ onality by exploring a mulƟ formity perspecƟ ve 
on raƟ onality in order to rethink the raƟ o between raƟ onality and philosophical pracƟ ce. This 
perspecƟ ve allows the polymorphous character of raƟ onality which helps to understand the lack of 
popularity and inconsistent use of the concept, and furthermore allows to conceptually disƟ nguish 
diff erent modes of thought which are oŌ en the subject of philosophical pracƟ ce. With the pluriform 
perspecƟ ve on raƟ onality and a categorizaƟ on between types of raƟ onality disƟ nguished by their 
main type of subject (like instrumental and value raƟ onality), types of raƟ onality disƟ nguished 
by their claim on general raƟ onality characterisƟ cs (like argumentaƟ on raƟ onality and bounded 
raƟ onality) and types disƟ nguished by the main ‘way of thinking’ subjects (like formal and refl ecƟ ve 
raƟ onality) we can clarify how philosophical pracƟ ce works with and on raƟ onality as a means and 
as a purpose.
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Even though it cannot be denied that the fi eld of philosophical pracƟ ce is growing, it 
cannot be ignored either that the growth is mainly in the pracƟ ce with children. Only a few 
pracƟ Ɵ oners manage to sell philosophy to companies. How should this be understood? Is it a 
‘normal’ maturing process that children go fi rst? Is the combinaƟ on of philosophy and business 
too peculiar? Or is the combinaƟ on of the pracƟ Ɵ oner with the businessman the boƩ leneck?
TheoreƟ cally philosophical pracƟ ce and business reality should fi t each other like a glove. That 
is, there are many books, masters and professors proclaiming the benefi t of the combinaƟ on. There 
is a hope for the great synthesis of the encounter between the two. Yet, in pracƟ ce, the fi t is not 
easily made.
Some books on philosophical pracƟ ce conclude that there is no ‘demand’ for it in business. It 
seems to follow obviously from the fact that there is liƩ le philosophical pracƟ ce within businesses. 
Yet this does not prove the absence of a demand at all. Apple’s tablet success has shown the world 
for once and for all that demand can be unconscious. Even though businessmen don’t ask for 
philosophy, they sƟ ll want and need it. So the quesƟ on, once again, is how to meet this demand?
Since I am one of of those who have managed to sell philosophy to the business and make 
a living out of it for quite some years now, it seems useful to provide the conference with a 
workshop on how the process goes and point out what has worked for me and what has not. This 
is an interacƟ ve presentaƟ on of how I have made it happen and of the lessons I learned. 
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within the fi nancial sector.
90
WORKSHOP
DAIMONION: A WORKSHOP ABOUT GUIDED IMAGERY AND SOCRATES’ INNER VOICE
by
Michael Noah Weiss
Norwegian Society for Philosophical PracƟ ce
michaelnoahweiss@gmail.com
In this workshop a certain approach of guided imagery (which is derived from the so called 
Trilogos method) is presented and applied in a group seƫ  ng, with the purpose to further invesƟ gate 
what Socrates called Daimonion – an “inner voice” giving orientaƟ on in everyday life. Focal points of 
discussion are how the SocraƟ c Daimonion – as a kind of ethical and spiritual agent providing intuiƟ ve 
wisdom – can be understood and (re)interpreted today, and for what purposes the technique of 
guided imagery can be of use in philosophical pracƟ ce.
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PracƟ cing the clinical humaniƟ es requires throwing oneself into the unpredictable locus of 
suff ering, where one is unable to infer the actual situaƟ on of the other, a process which fosters 
self-disclosure. By using the term “clinical humaniƟ es” we are aƩ empƟ ng to free the humaniƟ es 
and social sciences from their self-imposed boundaries which have brought them to their current 
dispirited condiƟ on.
Bringing the depth of the humaniƟ es and social sciences into the clinical fi eld in the service 
of relieving suff ering and seƫ  ng up a humaniƟ es support network will help the humaniƟ es renew 
itself by listening aƩ enƟ vely to the great amount of suff ering in the world. Conceived in this way, the 
clinical humaniƟ es has its own methodology and way of generaƟ ng insight, and also has a unique 
contribuƟ on to make to the amelioraƟ on of suff ering in all its forms. In moving beyond their current 
condiƟ on and into the clinical fi eld, the humaniƟ es and social sciences take on a new conceptual 
framework and a disƟ ncƟ ve rhythm.
From this perspecƟ ve, the encounter between nursing and the clinical humaniƟ es might 
be seen as the unlikely meeƟ ng of fundamentally diff erent and incompaƟ ble fi elds. Indeed, the 
humaniƟ es and social sciences may seem quite alien to nursing and clinical pracƟ ce. In this paper I 
explore diverse aspects of the clinical humaniƟ es and how they can be applied to nursing and nursing 
educaƟ on.I also invesƟ gate some innovaƟ ve perspecƟ ves on healing and the clinical humaniƟ es and 
the implicaƟ ons they have for nursing and nursing educaƟ on. 
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The focus of this paper is on the phenomenon of boredom, which is oŌ en described as the 
product of modern Ɵ mes. However, as early as in wriƟ ngs of LucreƟ us and Seneca we fi nd warnings 
on taedium vitae and horror loci, early ChrisƟ an monks suff ered under the demon of acedia, while the 
malady of melancholy plagued 17th and 18th century Europe. The Industrial RevoluƟ on altered the 
quality of human being in Ɵ me, now represented by the image of a mechanical clock, and invented 
concepts of leisure and boredom. In Modern Ɵ me a lot of eff ort was put on democraƟ zaƟ on of 
boredom. The relaƟ ve freedom from the necessity, the growing reliance on consumer goods as a 
way of energizing ourselves, and the sense of liberaƟ on and emancipaƟ on felt by many, provide 
the condiƟ ons where boredom can so easily, and eff ortlessly, be experienced. First part of the 
paper explores the interpretaƟ ve transformaƟ ons of the phenomenon of boredom, followed by the 
analysis of the existenƟ al disturbance that boredom provokes. On this grounds, the last part of the 
paper focuses on the quesƟ on whether boredom really represents a threat that must be fought 
against by all means. The concluding part off ers the perspecƟ ve that sees boredom as a moƟ vaƟ onal 
power that can induce change with far reaching posiƟ ve eff ects. 
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